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Abstract
This thesis aims to understand the role that organizational culture plays in creating
secure and resilient supply chains. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the
government's subsequent response, propelled supply chain security and resilience to the
forefront of industry's concerns. Public-private partnerships such as the Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) have capitalized upon these concerns and
created incentives for industry to address supply chain security and resilience both
internally and with their external partners. The thesis studies how companies manage
supply chain security and resilience, and specifically the role that organizational culture
plays in instilling their importance into the organization.
Senior security executives at twenty-three companies across a variety of
industries were interviewed. Companies were selected based on information previously
known about their high performance in the supply chain security and resilience arenas.
Interviewees were questioned about their company's security and business continuity
programs, and how they relate to the company's overall corporate culture. Schein's
organizational culture framework was used to analyze observations on three levels:
artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions. Each level of culture is
summarized, and key success factors for creating a supply chain security culture are
proposed. Before implementing these key success factors, it is recommended that
companies understand the supply chain security context, specifically the need for supply
chain security, the primary drivers behind supply chain security, and the overall corporate
culture. The high performance of the companies included in this study suggest that
implementation of the proposed key success factors, in alignment with a company's
supply chain security objectives and corporate culture, should increase supply chain
security and resilience performance throughout the company.
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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the government's subsequent
response propelled supply chain security to the forefront of industry's concerns. These
attacks alerted industry and governments to the potential for disruptions from high impact/low
probability events such as terrorism. Since September 11, 2001, public-private partnerships
such as the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and the Container
Security Initiative (CSI) have capitalized upon this concern and created incentives for
industry to address supply chain security both internally and with their external partners (see
Appendix A for brief descriptions of these programs). These initiatives have also encouraged
companies to broaden the scope of supply chain security beyond its historical focus on theft
avoidance to include disruptions such as natural disasters, sabotage, and terrorism. Companies
today are challenged with the dual task of securing their supply chains to prevent a variety of
potential disruptions, and improving resiliency to respond to them if and when they do occur.
For the purposes of this study, security is defined as protecting the integrity of
product, processes, and information from internal and external threats. The use of the term
"security program" throughout this study implies a program that assumes responsibility for
supply chain security. Resilience describes the ability of an organization to react to an
unexpected disruption and restore normal operations. The use of the term "business
continuity planning (BCP) program" throughout this study refers to a program charged with
maintaining business operations, which in turn emphasizes the need for resilience.
This study is just one initiative of the Supply Chain Response to Terrorism (SCRT)
project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Center for Transportation and
Logistics (CTL). The purpose of the SCRT project is to study the impact of high-impact/low-
probability disruptions, such as global terrorism, on supply chains. This particular study aims
to identify how companies manage their security and resilience programs, and specifically the
role that organizational culture plays in instilling their importance into the organizations.
Senior security officials at twenty-three companies across a variety of industries were
interviewed for this study. Companies were selected based on information previously known
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about their high performance in the security and resilience arenas. Interviewees were
questioned about their company's security and business continuity programs, and how they
relate to the company's overall corporate culture. Schein's organizational culture framework
was used to analyze the observations on three levels: artifacts, espoused values, and basic
underlying assumptions. Each level of culture is summarized, and key success factors for
creating a supply chain security culture are proposed.
1.1 Thesis Overview
Chapter One introduces the thesis and provides an overview of its organization.
Chapter Two includes a survey of the literature that covers three specific areas: supply chain
security, organizational culture theory, and anecdotal examples of corporate culture used to
further develop the chosen framework. Chapter Three provides a detailed overview of the
methodology used in this study and introduces the results.
Chapters Four and Five discuss observations in the context of the chosen framework
outlined in Chapter Three. Chapter Four discusses supply chain security artifacts, while
Chapter Five discusses supply chain security espoused values. Chapter Six builds on the
results in Chapters Four and Five to suggest three basic underlying assumptions that appear to
support adoption of a supply chain security culture. Chapter Seven suggests key success
factors useful in creating a supply chain security culture. Chapter Eight describes methods to
understand the company-specific context surrounding creation of this supply chain security




The literature review consisted of three parts. The first part involved surveying the
literature for research on the role of organizational culture in improving supply chain security
and resilience. The second part involved surveying the literature on corporate culture theory,
and choosing a framework with which to conduct my analysis. The final part involved further
developing that framework through a review of anecdotal literature on corporate culture.
2.1 Supply Chain Security Culture
Sheffi (2001) wrote one of the first articles to directly address supply chains' response
to terrorism. The article focuses on new ways of managing supply chains in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Sheffi recommends several business practices including
improving supplier relationships, revisiting inventory management, entering into public-
private partnerships, and increasing shipment visibility and collaboration. He also addresses
the issue of culture directly, stating "no Chief Security Officer or Security Organization will
be successful unless the culture of the enterprise adds security consciousness to its daily life."
Martha and Subbakrishna (2002) compare the effects of terrorist incidents to those
from other low probability, high impact events such as natural disasters. The authors
recommend increasing insurance levels, arranging for alternate sourcing and transportation,
influencing customer demand to match inventory, and revisiting minimum inventory levels.
The article provides comparisons of well-prepared and under-prepared companies in the wake
of events such as natural disasters, public health crises, and terrorist incidents.
Rice and Caniato (2003) conducted a survey of several companies with global
operations to determine the effectiveness of implementing both security and resilience
measures in the supply chain. The measures implemented by companies include improving
redundancy, flexibility, and focusing on business continuity planning. The authors categorized
companies' responses as basic, reactive, proactive, and advanced. One important group of
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responses dealt specifically with organizational capabilities, such as "socializing" security,
increasing visibility of security leadership, and providing extensive training to employees.
Lee and Wolfe (2003) argue that Total Quality Management (TQM) principles can
effectively assist in creating secure and resilient supply chains. Some of these principles
include prevention, designing security into the supply chain, keeping control of security
processes, and focusing on the process versus the final product. Lee and Whang (2003) draw
again from the quality movement, stating that the overriding theme of the quality movement
"that higher quality can be attained at lower cost by proper management and operational
design" can be applied to security as well. The authors provide a simple quantitative model
showing the cost benefits of participating in the Smart and Secure Tradelane Initiative (SST),
a public-private partnership (see Appendix A for a brief description of this program).
Finally, Coutu (2002) looks at the more human aspect of resilience, making the
connection between personality traits that foster resilience in individuals and how
organizations that embody these same traits can also be resilient. She concludes that resilient
people and organizations are those that face reality, search for meaning in all situations, and
ritualize ingenuity.
2.2 Corporate Culture Theory
Corporate culture first gained attention in the early 1970s as an elusive driving force
behind many organizations' success. The concept has grown in acceptance over the past thirty
years, and much research has been conducted regarding how to define, measure, and link
corporate culture to a company's success. Although difficult to quantify, corporate culture
acts as a behavioral mechanism that affects beliefs and norms used to make decisions in the
organizational context. At the most basic level, corporate culture can be expressed as simply
"how we do things around here." Members of an organization, in fact, may struggle to
understand or express their corporate culture. Although some companies have built their
success on specific cultures, such as 3M's focus on innovation and IBM's focus on customer
service, culture remains for many a strong, yet elusive, influence on their effectiveness.
The term culture finds its origins in social anthropology's studies of late nineteenth
and early twentieth century "primitive societies," such as Eskimo, African, and Native
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American peoples (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). Although the word culture brings to mind studies
of countries and their people, the terms can be equally applied to any defined group of people
with common affiliations or goals. The term "corporate culture" has been used to describe the
culture of people within a firm. This concept came to the forefront of business literature in the
early 1980s, when American businesses were in crisis compared to their successful Japanese
counterparts who were using different management techniques (Hofstede, 1986). Although no
universally accepted definition of corporate culture exists, the literature suggests a wide
variety of definitions that share common themes but differ in details.
In the early days of culture popularity, Schwarz and Davis (1981) described methods
to match corporate culture with business strategy. They relate anthropologist Clyde
Kulckhohn's definition of culture as "the set of habitual and traditional ways of thinking,
feeling and reacting that are characteristic of the ways a particular society meets its problems
at a particular point in time," with the idea that corporate culture "is reflected in the attitudes
and values, the management style, and the problem-solving behavior of its people." They
further define culture as "a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by the organization's
members.. .that produce norms that powerfully shape the behavior of individuals and groups."
Schwarz and Davis argue that leaders are often selected based on their embodiment of
these cultural norms, and then face a significant challenge when they are forced to violate
these norms in order to influence change in the organization. They state that culture overlaps
with structure, systems, and people of an organization, and that any attempt to influence
change through these three elements should be compatible with the existing culture.
Deal and Kennedy (1982) conducted a study of approximately eighty companies in an
attempt to understand their cultures. They determined that the main elements of culture are
business environment, values, heroes, rites and rituals, and the cultural network. They further
assert that "a strong culture is a system of informal rules that spell out how people are to
behave most of the time" and "a strong culture enables people to feel better about what they
do, so they are more likely to work harder."
Hampden-Turner (1990) asserts that cultures are simply responses to corporate
dilemmas, and therefore describes the culture of an organization as one that "defines
appropriate behavior, bonds, and motivates individuals, and asserts solutions where there is
ambiguity." According to this model, every corporation faces daily dilemmas, such as
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managing competing priorities, and the culture of the organization should be used to reconcile
these dilemmas.
Denison's research studies (1990) present a framework to study the close relationship
between the culture of an organization, its management practices, and its future performance
and effectiveness. In this study, he refers to culture as "the underlying values, beliefs, and
principles that serve as a foundation for an organization's management system as well as the
set of management practices and behaviors that both exemplify and reinforce those basic
principles."
In Managing People and Organizations, Lorsch (1991) examines the how managers
use organizational design to influence subordinates to work toward a firm's goals. In this
study, he argues that organization-design changes have more impact if they are consistent
with an existing culture. He defines culture in this context as "shared implicit and explicit
assumptions that members make about what is legitimate behavior in an organization.. .The
culture includes not only such norms about how people should behave but also the values they
are expected to hold."
Kotter and Heskett (1992) conducted numerous research studies in an attempt to tie
corporate culture to long term economic performance. As a result of their studies, they
describe organizational culture as having two levels. The first, shared values, occurs at a deep
level and is difficult to understand, and therefore change. These shared values comprise
"important concerns and goals that are shared by most of the people in a group, that tend to
shape group behavior, and that often persist over time even with changes in group
membership."
The second level, group behavior norms, are more visible and therefore easier to
change. This level comprises "common or pervasive ways of acting that are found in a group
that persist because group members tend to behave in ways that teach these practices (as well
as their shared values) to new members, rewarding those who fit in and sanctioning those who
do not." The authors also indicate that an organization may have many cultures, especially
those that are large and geographically dispersed, but the term corporate culture usually
applies to "values and practices that are shared across all groups in a firm, at least within
senior management."
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As evidenced above, many definitions for culture exist. The difficult nature of
attempting to define culture is addressed by Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv and Sanders (1990). In
the introduction to their work on measuring organizational cultures, they admit that "there is
no consensus on a definition for culture, but most authors will probably agree on the
following characteristics of the organizational/corporate culture construct: it is 1) holistic, 2)
historically determined, 3) related to anthropological concepts, 4) socially constructed, 5) soft,
and 6) difficult to change."
One definition, put forth by Edgar Schein (1992), appeared pervasive throughout the
literature. Schein defines organizational culture as "a pattern of shared basic assumptions that
the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that
has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems." Schein further
proposes that culture can be defined using the following three levels (Figure 2-1), where the
term level refers to "the degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to the observer."
" Artifacts: Visible organizational structures and processes (easy to observe, hard to
decipher)
" Espoused Values: Strategies, goals, philosophies (espoused justifications)
* Basic Underlying Assumptions: Unconscious, taken for granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts
and feelings (ultimate source of values and action)
14
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beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and
feelings (ultimate source of values
and action)
According to Schein, many people mistake artifacts and espoused values alone for
corporate culture, ignoring the basic underlying assumptions beneath them. He states,
however, that the basic underlying assumptions are the "essence" of culture. Artifacts are
items that are easily observed at the surface when someone encounters a new group with an
unfamiliar culture. Artifacts are easily observed, but their meaning is often hard to decipher.
Espoused values often begin as the reflection of someone's original values, for example the
leader of an organization. It is not until these espoused values are acted upon and tested by
members of the organization that they become shared values or beliefs. These shared values
and beliefs then may be transformed into the third level of culture, basic underlying
assumptions. Basic underlying assumptions are so strong that members in a group find
behavior that doesn't align with them inconceivable.
2.3 Schein's Modified Framework
In order to further develop Schein's framework, anecdotal examples of artifacts and
espoused values were gleaned from the literature to identify items that contribute to corporate
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culture, and grouped according to Schein's top two levels, artifacts and espoused values (see
Figure 2-2). Common artifacts include work practices and infrastructure, human resource
practices, education, communication, and measurement systems. Common espoused values
include leadership, responsibility, and value systems, as these three items dictate, explicitly or
through example, how members of the organization should behave.
Figure 2-2 Levels of Culture (modified from Schein, 1992)
Artifacts Visible Organizational
Work Practices Structures and processes








Basic Underlying Assumptions Unconscious, taken-for
Unique to company granted beliefs, perceptions,
Example: Team performance is more thoughts, andfeelings
important than individual performance (ultimate source of values
and action)
Note that basic underlying assumptions are unique to each organization, and are
therefore difficult to categorize. These assumptions provide members with insight into the
basis for the organization's objectives and priorities. Some examples of basic underlying
assumptions are that team performance is more important than individual performance, or that
designing a company to operate at a financial loss in a capitalist environment is inconceivable
(Schein, 1992). Because of their unique nature, it is impossible to generalize basic underlying
assumptions of an organization through reading one article about a company, or interviewing
one member of a company.
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2.3.1 Artifacts
The following section describes groups of artifacts including work practices and
infrastructure, human resource practices, education, measurement systems, and
communication, with examples drawn from the literature where appropriate.
2.3.1.1 Work Practices
This category covers the broad range of systems and policies put in place by an
organization in order to facilitate achievement of their objectives. From the bare bones outline
of a job description to an innovative formalized teamwork structure, these practices can
provide a sense of organizational culture, priorities, and individual responsibilities. These
processes are put in place to help employees make routine decisions in response to predictable
events, and may therefore provide the basis for decision-making in unpredictable situations.
Some organizations rely on a corporate program to facilitate their overarching cultural
objectives, such as Total Quality Management (quality), Safety Management Systems
(safety), or the Toyota Production System (quality, lean). Others will create systems geared
toward the organization's goals. At Norm Thompson Outfitters, a clothing catalogue company
dedicated to sustainability, they created a Sustainability Action Plan which identified
prevention of global warming, toxics, habitat destruction, and waste as the company's top
priorities and incorporated them into the their business goals (Smith, 2003). At Toyota,
employees are grouped into small teams that are cross-trained to compensate in areas where
one employee may be lacking. In addition, managers' span of control is reduced to allow for
further involvement in the managers' areas of responsibility (Krafik, 1998). In the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Control community, controllers are assigned in
teams of two to ensure redundancy in decision-making, a necessary factor in an organization
described as having a "high reliability" culture (Roberts, 1990).
Another important aspect of work practices that is conducted formally and informally
is experimentation and exercising of cultural values. The experimentation practice happens
informally in environments where employees are allowed to try new ideas without fear of
retribution. At a General Electric Plant in Massachusetts, for example, one key aspect of a
change in the safety procedures of the plant involved allowing employees to present safety-
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conscious ideas and act on them without inhibiting oversight from plant mangers (Simon,
1999).
Formal exercises are often carried out in military organizations, in an attempt to
follow standard operating procedures to determine if they will be successful in the face of a
particular scenario. The U.S. Army in particular conducts intense two-week long training
sessions where an organizational unit of 3000-4000 people competes with a like-sized
competitor to complete a realistic simulation of conflict. After the exercise, they conduct
After Action Reports where members attempt to understand what went wrong, why, and how
to prevent it in the future (Pascale, 1997). According to a recent SCRT interview with an
automotive manufacturer, their organization conducts war-gaming drills for potential
disruption of their supply chains to improve training, knowledge management, and knowledge
capture.
2.3.1.2 Human Resources Practices
One way of perpetuating organizational culture is to seek out potential employees that
are either inherently aligned with the organizational cultural values, or show a strong
propensity to eventually conform to these values. Human resources personnel should clearly
define those cultural attributes that the organization values, and look for their manifestation in
potential applicants. For example, Toyota tends to seek out young, educated minds that have
little experience elsewhere but show the appropriate attitude and potential to learn (Vaghefi,
2000). At Procter and Gamble, the company does not try to oversell themselves to potential
candidates, but rather aims to provide their applicants with an understanding of the company
and encourage them to voluntary deselect themselves if they do not think they will "fit in."
(Pascale, 1985) U.S. Navy Admiral (ADM) Rickover, credited as the father of the navy
nuclear power program, bypassed all standard naval recruiting procedures and hand picked
sailors he felt would best succeed in the program (Bierly, 1995).
After hiring, some organizations choose to present an employee with a code of
conduct that specifically lies within the "value system" of the organization (See Section
2.3.2.3). This code of conduct, along with relevant job requirements, should be used when
evaluating an employee's performance for incentives, promotion, termination, etc. If an
employee does not demonstrate alignment with the organizational cultural values, action
should be taken according to human resource policy (termination, punishment, additional
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training, etc). For example at IBM, if an employee commits an act that goes against the
corporate culture, they are sent to the "penalty box." This means that they are generally
rotated to a less desirable position in order to have time to ponder their actions, and to allow
organizational memory to fade so they can be placed someplace more effective for their next
assignment (Pascale, 1985).
2.3.1.3 Education
Both new and current employees require regular education not only to understand their
job descriptions, but also to remain up to date with an organization's cultural values. This
education may be conducted through formal training or more informal socialization. Formal
training on the organization's values is often given to new employees upon hiring. At IBM for
example, all new Master of Business Administration (MBA) employees and seasoned
professionals undergo the same training process at the beginning of their IBM tenure (Pascale,
1985). At Marriott, all employees must go through a weeklong training that deals specifically
with the company values. During this training, employees are required to role-play in difficult
scenarios that make them apply the company value system to their decision-making process
(Pascale, 1985).
In the U.S. military, intense training is conducted in the form of basic training ("boot
camp") for enlisted ranks and through Officer Candidate School or military academy training
for officers. These training sessions not only focus on the nuts and bolts of military duties, but
also on less tangible factors such as leadership, morals and ethics. All recruits in the U.S.
Marine Corps specifically must struggle through a 54-hour field exercise called The Crucible.
This exercise presents recruits with a series of grueling challenges with little sleep or food,
with the intent of instilling pride, teamwork, high energy and most importantly, loyalty to the
organization (Katzenbach, 1999).
In those organizations that pride themselves on creating a culture defined by an
overarching value, such as safety, quality, or leanness, formal training in these particular areas
may accompany job training. This training serves to educate employees on the importance of
these values, and how to incorporate them into everyday behaviors within the company. At
Norm Thompson Outfitters, for example, they realized that their employees and suppliers
didn't really know what the principles of sustainability were. To remedy the situation they
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partnered with a non-profit organization to educate every level of employee on the guiding
principles of sustainability (Smith, 2003).
Another aspect of education comes in the form of socialization. While the training
programs mentioned above have a formal structure, an underlying aim is to socialize
employees into the organization's culture. This can also be done informally as well. For
example at Toyota, employees are indirectly required to attend many outside social events
with their colleagues, a practice in line with Japanese culture (O'Reilly, 1989). At Bain and
Company, all junior associates are subjected to what is deemed "meeting overload."
Associates are forced to attend many types of meetings-company, office, case team,
recruiting, team, social-in an attempt to build cohesiveness within and identification with the
firm (Pascale, 1985).
Another important aspect of socialization is the use of folklore in demonstrating an
organization's values. In the former Bell system, employees used to share stories about severe
conditions that employees had overcome to keep phones working, demonstrating the level of
employee commitment in reaching the company's goals. This folklore was so pervasive that
in times of natural disaster it empowered Bell employees to cut corners and achieve the
extraordinary without being confined by existing corporate bureaucracy (Pascale, 1985).
Another example of the power of tradition can be found at Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC),
where new recruits are introduced to the Walk of Leaders, a hall in the Corporate
Headquarters that is full of memorabilia commemorating great moments in the company's
history (Katzenbach, 1999).
2.3.1.4 Measurement Systems
Once work processes and cultural values have been communicated to current and
future employees, a cogent method must exist to measure their success. Without a solid
measurement system, employees may feel lost in the performance of their duties. This may
also send the message that management does not place emphasis on job performance or
alignment with cultural values. Measurement systems may come in the form of adherence to
standards or regulations, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
9000 or Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Guidelines. It may also
come through measurement systems embedded in programs such as Total Quality
Management. At Chrysler, for example, the concept of "quality gates" dictates that if quality
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guidelines are not met at certain stages of a project, the project will not move forward
(Vasilash, 2003). At Norm Thompson Outfitters, buyers are provided with a sustainability
toolkit and scorecard designed to educate them about sustainable principles and provide them
with a method of measuring success in their decisions (Smith, 2003).
Another method of measuring success in adherence to cultural values is through the
use of audits or assessments. These audits involve looking at such things as statistical
performance, employee reviews, and perception questionnaires. Several consultants offer
cultural assessment models that utilize these methods, such as The Simon Open System
Culture Change Model (Simon, 1999) and the K.L. Strategic Change Consulting Group's
Corporate Change Model (K.L. Strategic Change Consulting website, 2005).
2.3.1.5 Communication
Communication on two levels, internal and external, plays an important role in an
organization's culture. Internally, employees need to know what should be communicated, in
what time frame, and how to do so. For example, Sears holds town hall meetings in an
attempt to communicate in a straightforward manner to all members of the company (Pascale,
1997). The standard presentation format at IBM is through the use of flip charts, where
common practice is for the audience to probe the presenter with questions (Pascale 1985). Air
traffic controllers use a very specialized language to pass information along in a timely and
accurate fashion.
Another aspect of internal communication involves feedback to employees on their
performance. At Intel, the "constructive confrontation" method encourages employees to deal
with disagreements in an immediate and direct manner. At Shell, the company uses
"valentines," a concept borrowed from Ford, to facilitate communication and conduct conflict
resolution. Valentines are regular gatherings of salaried and hourly employees where they are
encouraged to air grievances and work together to propose solutions. A similar process of
"creative conflict" is utilized at Johnson & Johnson (O'Reilly, 1989). The After Action
Reviews conducted by the U.S. Army and described above, provide an open environment for
identifying what went wrong during an exercise and how to address shortcomings (Pascale,
1997). These accepted methods of communication provide a comfortable forum for effective
communication within the organization.
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External communication can also be extremely important when dealing with supply
chain issues. If a company holds particular cultural values above others, they must inform
their suppliers and incorporate these values into their decisions making processes. An SCRT
interview with one technology company described their feeling that personal relationships and
reciprocal knowledge builds reliable relationships, obviating the need for flexibility
agreements in contracts. At Norm Thompson Outfitters, their buyers educate and partner with
their supply chain partners to make sustainability based decisions and potentially change the
way products are manufactured or selected for inclusion in their catalogues (Smith, 2003).
Effective external communication is a key tool in ensuring that cultural values are supported
throughout the supply chain.
Internal and external communication can also play an important role in the resilience
of an organization in a crisis situation, as evidenced by the supplier fire that severely
threatened the performance of mobile phone handset producers Nokia and Ericsson. A fire in
March of 2000 at a Philips plant in Albuquerque New Mexico destroyed the manufacturer's
inventory and many items in production. Philips notified both Nokia and Ericsson, their
primary customers, within three days; however word traveled very differently within the
companies. Nokia's culture encouraged bad news to travel fast, and the situation was briefed
up the chain of the command almost immediately despite the initial report that the plant would
soon be back up and running. This rapid communication allowed Nokia to work closely with
Philips and other suppliers to come up with a solution to their shortages. At Ericsson, the
news traveled much slower, and the head of their mobile phone decision didn't hear about the
problem until early April. At this point it was too late to overcome the severe shortage of
chips, and Ericsson withdrew entirely from the mobile phone handset production business
shortly thereafter. In this example, the encouraged method of communication at Nokia, aimed
at uncovering problems as soon as they arise, led to the ultimate success of Nokia over
Ericsson in the industry (Latour, 2001).
2.3.2 Espoused Values
The following section discusses leadership, responsibility and value systems. These
items are grouped under espoused values since they project an understanding of how an
organization's members should act, either explicitly or by example.
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2.3.2.1 Leadership
Leadership style plays a large role in any cultural endeavor. Leadership may manifest
itself in the form of general leadership principles within an organization, or a specific person
or organizational unit designated to carry out the application of cultural ideals to the depths of
an organization. An example of the former would be organization-specific leadership
principles that get passed on through educational programs. An example of the latter would be
a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), a department head, or a person charged with implementing
a functional culture, such as a safety or quality officer. While not every organization can be
blessed with an omnipresent or powerful leader, the most important aspect of leadership when
inculcating cultural values is demonstrated commitment to those values. Those in leadership
positions must not only communicate an organization's cultural values, but they must
demonstrate them continually through their decision making process. A leader who declares
cultural intentions but does not back them up will most likely not gain the trust and support of
those he is trying to influence.
For example, at one General Electric plant, a decline in safety performance was
adversely affecting employee morale and productivity. A series of safety officers attempted to
instill new safety leadership and programs, but it wasn't until a cultural audit was conducted
that they realized that managers and labor force had conflicting ideas about the safety at the
plant. While they both knew that the safety record was lacking, the managers had a more
positive outlook than the laborers in areas such as incentives and rewards. Once these
differences were identified, a productive process changed the safety culture of the plan
dramatically (Simon, 1999).
A strong leader can make an enormous difference in an organization's culture and its
success. An extreme example of the power of one specific leader comes in the form of Rick
Rescorla, the Vice President of Corporate Security at Morgan Stanley. A decorated Vietnam
Veteran, Mr. Rescorla not only predicted the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, but created
an evacuation plan for the company that was exercised, often begrudgingly, many times by its
employees. Mr. Rescorla used this expertise and authority on September 11, 2001 to help
2700 well-trained Morgan Stanley employees evacuate the towers. As a result, only six
Morgan Stanley employees perished that day. Unfortunately, Mr. Rescorla was one of them
(Grunwald, 2001).
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Another example of extreme leadership can be found in Admiral (ADM) Rickover of
the United States Navy. ADM Rickover is called the "father of the nuclear navy" and is
credited with spearheading creation of the first nuclear submarine and the nuclear navy as a
whole. He was obsessive about the quality of his employees and the standards of the nuclear
program, going above and beyond normal navy hiring regulations and hand screening every
officer applicant into the program. ADM Rickover continued to exert his powerful influence
over the ships, technology and personnel of the nuclear navy for three decades (Bierly, 1995).
A final example of strong leadership can be found within Lucent Technology's recent
shift. Mr. Jose Mejia, President of Lucent Supply Chain Networks, initiated a dramatic shift in
that company's supply chain management practices by focusing on the company's culture. He
introduced a "burning" platform that focused on the dire state of the company and used its
proud history to inspire people to change the way they did business. He focused on alignment
through the use of the phrase "kill snakes." A "snake" was anything that was not in alignment
with the organization's cultural values, and his attitude was that snakes needed to be put on
the table immediately, and dealt with, i.e. "killed." Finally, Mr. Meija consistently
emphasized honest, open communication between employees at all levels and stages of
product management, as well as between Lucent employees and their suppliers (Scholtz,
2004).
2.3.2.2 Responsibility
Another important aspect of organizational culture is responsibility. In order for
cultural values to penetrate the organization, all members must feel responsible for upholding
these values. If an employee does not feel that upholding the cultural values affects their
employment, promotion, or status, then they may not feel obliged to do anything. In high
reliability organizations, such as the nuclear community of the U.S. Navy and the FAA air
traffic control system, extremely high levels of responsibility are required at the operator level
so that each operator understands the consequences of their actions (Bierly, 1995).
The level of responsibility must also be clearly tied to incentives (or disincentives) for
certain behavior. For example, At 3M, the "15% Rule" allows employees to spend 15% of
their time engaged in researching their own ideas that they feel may eventually be useful to
the company. This rule, along with money provided through "Seed Capital" and "Genesis
Grants", help stimulate an environment of innovation (Studt, 2003).
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Another important aspect of responsibility ties into the leadership principles discussed
above. In many cases, it is important to have a single person or group that is charged with
ensuring that cultural values are demonstrated at all levels of the organization. The placement
within the organization affects the way that it is viewed throughout the organization, for
example a security department that falls within the compliance group may be treated
differently than a security department that falls under operations. These differing perspectives
often depend on the cultural values of an organization.
2.3.2.3 Value System
Many organizations have an explicitly stated value system in the form of a company
mission statement, code of conduct, core values, or motto. These values generally offer a clear
and concise manifestation of the company's values that may be used to provide motivation or
aid in the decision making process. Some better known mottos include Hewlett Packard's
"The HP Way," Ford's "Quality is Job 1," and the "Delta Family Feeling." Each military
service embeds their cultural values within their "core values." For example the U.S. Navy
and Marine Corps' "honor, courage, and commitment" and the U.S. Coast Guard's "honor,
respect and devotion to duty" are used at all levels of training to inculcate cultural values in
their new recruits' mindset. In addition to these succinct and often catchy value systems,
many organizations will draft a more comprehensive mission or value statement that covers
multiple specific topics and is well-publicized throughout the organization.
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3 Methodology
This chapter discusses different methods of studying culture, and provides a detailed
summary of the methodology used during this study. The chapter also summarizes the
observations of the study, which are discussed in further detail in following chapters.
3.1 Studying Culture
According to Schein, culture may be studied three ways (Schein,1992a). The first, the
survey research approach, approaches culture through identification of "deep" conceptual
definitions of culture such as "mental models" or "basic assumptions," but then attempts to
quantify culture through individual questionnaires. This, Schein states, forces data into certain
dimensions and addresses culture only on a superficial level.
A second method of studying culture, the ethnographic approach, originates in
anthropology and sociology. Use of this method assumes that culture reaches into such depths
of an organization, that they must be extensively observed and interviewed. The result of this
is a "thick description" of culture, but according to Schein, it ignores the conceptual and
definitional problems of the concept of culture.
The third method of studying culture, and the one used in this study, is called the
analytical descriptive approach. Using this approach, one breaks culture down into specific
components that are easier to measure and describe. While this approach is practical for
research purposes, Schein argues that this focus on the manifestations of a culture's "deeper"
phenomena do not address the core concepts of an organization's culture. This argument
supports the focus of this study on observed artifacts and espoused values, with suggestions of
basic assumptions that should be present for a supply chain security culture.
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3.2 Methodology
While none of the three methods described above provides a perfect method of
studying culture, the analytical descriptive approach fit well with the research goals of this
study. The research for this thesis was conducted in two phases. Phase one entailed a
comprehensive literature review of supply chain security and organizational culture, as
presented in Chapter Two. This literature review included work conducted to date as part of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Supply Chain Response to Terrorism
(SCRT) Project. The literature on organizational culture theory was then used to develop a
framework with which to analyze data to be collected in phase two.
During phase two, a questionnaire was created based on this framework and used to
conduct interviews with senior security executives at twenty-one manufacturers, distributors,
and transportation providers. Two additional security and risk consultants were interviewed
about their general experiences in the field. In order to protect the confidentiality of
interviewees, their titles have been generalized, and companies are referred to throughout this
study as Company A through Company U. Table 3-1 provides fundamentals of each
company, including industry, generalized title of interviewee, approximate range of annual
sales, and approximate range of employees. The companies interviewed varied in size,
industry, and nationality, but they all maintain a major presence in the United States.
Companies were chosen based on information previously known about their high
security or resilience performance, and on their anticipated ability to contribute to the study.
Most companies either had a prior relationship with MIT's Center for Transportation and
Logistics (CTL), or expressed desire to participate in the study based on information provided
on the CTL website. This thesis does not claim to be a statistically significant study of several
companies, or a random selection of companies representing all industries, rather a hand-
picked groups of companies chosen based on the above-mentioned criteria.
Interviewees were senior executives charged with security responsibilities. Although
most of the interviewees were charged with security and not business continuity planning
responsibilities, they were all questioned about both programs. This was done to gauge
security executives' awareness and involvement in business continuity planning efforts.
The questionnaire, provided as Appendix B, included twenty-four questions
addressing supply chain security practices, business continuity practices, and corporate
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culture. The interviews were semi-structured in that the response to each question dictated the
follow-up question. Not ask all questions were asked of all interviewees, nor were the
questions included on the questionnaire the only ones asked. If a specific item warranted
further discussion, additional question were asked. Additional questions and answers were
recorded in brackets in the transcribed interview reports.
Table 3-1 Company Fundamentals
Company A Grocery 10-50 VP ot Asset Protection 200-250
VP of Security and VP of
Company B Marine Shipping 1-10 Customer Service NA
Assistant VP for
Company C Railroad 1-10 Customer Service 10-50
Company D Electronics 1-10 Security Manager 10-50
Company E Automotive 150-200 Security Administrator 300-350
Consumer Products VP of Corporate Security
Company F Manufacturer 10-50 DirectorofCorporate_ 10-50
Director of Corporate
Company G Toys 1-10 Security 10-50
Company H Automotive 0.1-0.5 Risk Assessment Leader NA
Computer Security Manager
Company I Hardware 50-100 150-200
Company J Computer Services 50-100 Director of Security 350-400
Company K Electronics 10-50 Director of Security 50-100
Senior Director of
Company L Food 10-50 Security 100-150
Company M Apparel 1-10 Senior Vice President 100-150
Senior Business
Company N Footwear 10-50 Continuity Analyst 10-50
Company 0 Marine Shipping 10-50 Security Officer 1-10
Director of Governmental
Company P Marine Shipping 1-10 Policy NA
Company Q Pharmaceutical 50-100 Director of Security 100-150
Director of Import
Company R Footwear 10-50 Operations 1-10
Computer Director of Supply Chain
Company S Hardware 1-10 Security 10-50
Manager of Operations
Company T Retail 10-50 and Investigations 300-350
Transportation Director of Security
Company U Services 10-50 350-400
1) Source: Hoover's, Inc.
2) Some titles and Industries have been generalized
3) NA = Not Available
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3.3 Summarized Observations
Upon completion of the interviews, observations were distilled into artifacts and espoused
values that contribute to creating a supply chain security culture, and grouped according to the
modified Schein framework presented in Section 2.3 (3-1). Chapter Four describes select
observations categorized as artifacts, while Chapter Five describes select observations
categorized as espoused values. Chapter Six then suggests three basic underlying assumptions
that support a supply chain security culture. Appendix C provides a detailed matrix
summarizing observations from these interviews.
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Figure 3-1 Supply Chain Culture Artifacts, Espoused Values, and Basic
Underlying Assumptions (modified from Schein, 1992)
Artifacts
Work Practices and Infrastructure:
Security Program Organization
C-TPAT Initiatives



















Security affects employees' safety
Security affects employees' livelihood
Security is "the right thing to do"
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4 Artifacts
Schein describes artifacts as visible organizational structures and processes. These are
items that are easily identifiable, especially by a person who is unfamiliar with the
organization. As a result, artifacts are often used to describe an organization's culture.
Although artifacts are easily observed, their true meaning is often difficult to decipher. The
framework depicted in Figure 3-1 categorizes artifacts into five major groups. Four of these
groups also contain sub-groups that are specific to supply chain security. This chapter
describes supply chain security artifacts, organized under the following groups and sub-
groups.
" Work Infrastructure and Practices
o Security Program Organization
o Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Initiatives
o Interaction with Business Continuity Planning Programs
o Collaboration
" Human Resource Practices
o Employee Background Screening








4.1 Work Infrastructure and Practices
Work practices encompass the broad range of systems and policies put in place by an
organization in order to facilitate achievement of their objectives, which for the purposes of
this study is supply chain security. The initial framework includes items such as teamwork,
systems design, and experimentation. Phase two of this research, however, focused on the
infrastructure that these work practices took place in. This section summarizes work
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infrastructure and practices common to many companies that had the most effect on supply
chain security programs. This section also includes supporting observations where
appropriate.
4.1.1 Security Program Organization
Every company who participated in the study has an established security program,
although not necessarily one dedicated to supply chain security. These programs are generally
administered at corporate headquarters, and are often divided them into segments including
physical security, personnel security, supply chain security, information technology security,
and investigations. The corporate security staff ranges from one person to many, and they are
usually charged with creation and dissemination of security standards, educating employees,
conducting oversight, and conducting investigations into security incidents. Some companies
also operate 24-hour security centers where they keep track of world events and intelligence
that may help them predict or respond to incidents that occur.
Although corporate staff maintains oversight of these programs, most companies
delegate responsibility for implementation of the programs down to the field level. At this
level, the senior business manager at each location is held responsible for ensuring the
security program is being followed. This manager may report to a regional or country security
manager, depending on the size and global distribution of the company. The local business
manager may also be assisted by full- or part-time security personnel who are either employed
by the company or a third party firm specializing in security. The distribution of security
personnel is discussed further in Section 4.2.2.
With this common structure, the corporate staff often acts as a consultant to their field
personnel. At Company J, for example, security is the responsibility of the process owner, not
the security group, as demonstrated by their Director of Security who refers to himself as a
security consultant. He provides security support for those organizations that deal with
product development and all of their research efforts, and tries to keep senior executive
management in those lines of business current on the kind of threats and exposures that they
face as a business.
At Company F, security is considered a corporate function, and the corporate staff
members are also viewed as in house consultants. Each Company F operating entity is
responsible for security, which, according to their VP for Corporate Security, is both good and
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bad. Their principle manufacturing sites have full time security managers, but they are the
exception to the rule. According to this VP, "in the rest of our manufacturing sites and in just
about every one of our value chain locations, [security] is a collateral duty. So we have to then
not only oversee this function, but also train and support the man or woman that is wearing
the security hat for 10-15% of their time."
The Investigations Manger for Company D views their security program as consisting
of two completely separate organizations, one in their operations division that includes
production, logistics, and research, and another in their headquarters, that includes sales,
finance, and information technology. The operations side of the program is very formalized,
while the headquarters program is much more informal. The Investigations Manager on the
headquarters side works often with their area and country security managers, traveling
internationally at their request to assist with specific problems.
4.1.1.1 Influence of Safety Program
Many security programs are modeled after existing safety and environmental health
programs, and therefore share the same structure. Safety programs are also generally
administered at the corporate level, with field personnel in place to implement and monitor
the program's effectiveness. The field personnel may be charged with safety duties full time,
but are often responsible for safety on a part-time basis along with other duties, including
security. Accountability for adherence to the safety program is relegated to the general
manager at a facility, along with other programs such as security or quality. Safety programs
also usually include an audit process that may be conducted in conjunction with the security
program (see Section 4.4.2). Finally, safety programs usually have a strong regulatory
component, often based on standards set forth by the Federal Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (OSHA) or other local governing bodies. Although technically a voluntary
program, Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) plays a similar role as
OSHA in providing very broad security standards.
Company 0, for example, established an International Standardization Organization
(ISO) 9000-based program in the late 1980's to monitor the safety of their vessels. They have
since expanded this program twice, first to include environmental aspects, and a second time
to include security challenges. This process allowed them to utilize existing policy and
procedures to address their security objectives in a timely and familiar fashion. Company P
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has used their existing safety, health and environment committee to provide a conduit for
security reporting.
The presence of an established safety program often assists in encouraging employees
to embrace of a security program, since they often share common characteristics such as
providing a workplace free of internal and external threats. While safety programs generally
focus on preventing accidents from within, security programs spend more time trying to
prevent external disruptions to their facilities.
At Company E, safety and security work hand in hand, as safety is one of the
company's overriding values. The safety and security programs utilize the same
communication methods, and often stand on committees together to evaluate new projects.
Company E views safety as a means to protect their assets, primary their people. According to
their Security Administrator, "[Company E] employees know that corporate is going to
protect you, provide you with a safe work environment. It's really drummed into you. I think
people feel that security is part of that."
The respondent from Company I feels that safety and security overlap in many areas.
An example of using this overlap to mitigate safety and security risk came at a time when
Company I's employees and customers were concerned about potentially hazardous materials
coming in to the workplace through the mail. Company I's safety personnel combined their
technical know-how of hazardous materials with the security personnel's knowledge of threat
assessment, to design a screening process for all packages coming into Company I facilities.
As a railroad, Company C has a deep historical safety culture. This culture pervades
both the field and office-based activities, where personnel conduct safety briefings before
each meeting or job begins. Company C relies on their safety program when handling
hazardous materials and equipment, but they also rely on their security program to understand
the origins and detailed information about handling shipments. According to their Assistant
VP for Customer Service, "security is becoming a higher priority because people are starting
to realize that security is an integral part of safety as a broader concept."
Safety concerns may also be used to help justify security investments. At Company
D, for example, the Investigations Manager uses safety concerns to implement security
measures at the field level. According to him, "safety is a huge thing at this company and if I
can show that there is a safety need in the company, [the security measure] has a much better
chance of getting through."
34
Although the presence of a safety program often helps facilitate security, some
companies view the distinction as blurred. The VP of Security at Company B views the line
between safety and security as very thin at the field level, since "some of the conventions for
security were some of the same conventions that were in place before for safety reasons." At
Company G, the safety program is viewed as having an advantage over security, since the
safety program is backed by regulations while the security program, and C-TPAT, are still
viewed as voluntary. As a result of this difference, the company relies on a company mandate
to abide by security regulations, rather than employees' inherent knowledge that the mandate
is backed by regulations.
Although safety and security overlap in many instances, some firms prefer to keep the
two disciplines separate. Company F, for example, maintains a strong safety culture,
presumably as a result of their strong manufacturing background. The success of this program
is reflected in their low injury rates and numerous OSHA awards. Despite the success of this
program, the company keeps the two disciplines separate except in areas where they are
forced to overlap, such as building evacuation. From their VP for Corporate Security's
perspective, "I'm in no hurry to go down that road [combining safety and security] because
we're not staffed up for it and there is a whole knowledge basis there. I think we're large
enough that we can keep it discrete."
Company Q also maintains a strong safety culture, as is common in the highly
regulated pharmaceutical industry. While they recognize that safety and security overlap at
the site level, they feel that at the corporate level there is less overlap than in other industries.
According to their Director of Security, "I think this is the changing nature of security.. .I
think security should be a full time job in many places, and not part of the safety effort,
they're different. For a smaller company it might make sense to combine the two, but for a
larger company it does not."
4.1.1.2 Influence of Quality Program
Quality programs also integrate with security programs at the field level, although to a
lesser extent than with safety. The majority of overlap between the two programs comes in
two areas, auditing and incident analysis. Many companies have quality auditing teams that
visit their facilities on a regular basis. In some cases, these teams have been charged with
additional security requirements, in order to avoid expending resources on additional teams
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(See Section 4.4.2). Another area where security programs have adopted quality methods is
the approach and analysis of security issues (See Section 4.4.1).
At one company, security has switched from partnering with safety to partnering with
quality. Company L's main focus is protection of their product, so they felt that the quality
group was the most responsible for the quality of their product. As a result, the security
program partners with the quality group to develop security standards in their framework.
According to their Senior Director of Security, "[quality] has been ingrained since day one at
[Company L], so it was a natural thing to hitch our wagons to quality, then its an already
accepted practice, we don't have to reinvent the wheel.. .we live and die by quality."
4.1.2 Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
Initiatives
Every company we interviewed, with the exception of one, identified the Customs
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) initiative as a core part of their security
program. The United States Customs and Border Protection Department (U.S. CBP, formerly
known as U.S. Customs) instituted the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT) program in November 2001, and updated it in March 2005. This public-private
partnership was born out of CBP's recognition that close cooperation with industry would be
paramount to providing the highest level of supply chain security in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. C-TPAT aims to engage the private sector in securing
the global supply chain in exchange for streamlined inspection processes.
In order to become C-TPAT validated, applicants must submit a self-assessment of
their supply chain security practices to CBP, addressing such areas as physical security,
personnel security, education and training, access controls, manifest procedures, and
conveyance security. In addition to this worksheet, importers are told to "develop and
implement a sound plan to enhance security procedures throughout your supply chain. Where
an importer does not control a facility, conveyance, or process subject to these
recommendations, the importer agrees to make every reasonable effort to secure compliance
by the responsible party" (U.S. CBP website, 2005). This significant aspect of C-TPAT
ensures that members do not focus solely on their own facilities or those in the U.S., but that
they address their entire global supply chain. The majority of companies view the cost of not
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complying with C-TPAT, in terms of effect on speed-to-market, as the main driver for
participation in the program.
In general, the larger companies with established global security programs view C-
TPAT as a means to document procedures already in place, educate suppliers through
contractual requirements, improve relations with CBP, and gain competitive advantage by
being subject to fewer inspections. The respondent from Company D, for example, feels that
they have benefited from C-TPAT through being forced to document security procedures that
were already in place. According to their Investigations Manager, "in most cases we're doing
what we need to do from safety and security standpoint, but what we're doing has not been
properly documented. C-TPAT has forced us to document what we're currently doing." When
Company K applied for C-TPAT certification, CBP conducted an on-site validation process
and accepted their security program as is. According to their Director of Security, CBP
commented that they had "evolved security to a science, and that [Company K] had the best
program they had seen to date."
Smaller companies with fewer resources, or companies with a lesser concern for
security, have used C-TPAT as a guideline to create or strengthen their existing programs.
Company G, for example, views themselves as a low-risk importer with high volumes of low-
value product that don't justify extensive security investments. They realize, however, that if
they do not comply with C-TPAT, they will no longer be considered a low-risk importer and
will potentially be subject to additional inspections. From the security standpoint, this threat
from C-TPAT has allowed the company to institute security initiatives that may not have been
accepted otherwise.
Company R has relied heavily on C-TPAT to shape their current security program.
Company R does not own any manufacturing facilities, so their security concerns lie heavily
on their U.S retail stores and distribution channels. According to their Director of Import
Operations, C-TPAT was a starting point for conducting risk analysis and putting controls in
place to mitigate that risk. This process was put in place, despite limited resources. This
Director states, "it seems that when C-TPAT occurred there was a cottage industry of people
coming in saying they were security professionals and we didn't have much of a budget so we
tried to socialize it more to use our existing resources."
Most companies indicate that C-TPAT has at the very least raised awareness
throughout the company about the need for security. Company B's VP of Security, for
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example, stated that C-TPAT has "raised awareness and provided guidelines for people in
terms of evaluating their people, process and technology for security.... [Executives] all now
understand C-TPAT, so when we talk about our business, they have C-TPAT in the back of
their mind."
At Company S, C-TPAT has also helped with awareness and the treatment of security
as a priority. According to their Director for Supply Chain Security, "What [C-TPAT] has
done is solidified the need for a dedicated supply chain security group within the global
security organizations. That didn't exist prior.. .When I needed people, I would have to
compete for time with their manager...and now I have my own people. I think C-TPAT
helped that."
4.1.3 Collaboration
Collaboration also plays an important role in creating effective security programs.
Observed formal collaboration efforts fall into three broad categories: internal collaboration
between a company's organizational units, external collaboration within the industry, and
external collaboration with government.
Most internal collaboration with security comes in the form of leadership councils at
the senior executive level. These councils include senior security managers and other
members of the company's departments (i.e. Finance, Legal, Operations, Human Resources,
etc.), and provide a forum to give input into company decisions involving security. For
example, Company J formed a Global Trade Council to address supply chain security, and C-
TPAT implementation in particular. This Council comprises the VP for Import Compliance,
the Director of Security, and the VP for Government programs. According to their Director of
Security, "a big part of my job is working with executive management in the various lines of
business to convince them that they need to be implementing appropriate security measures in
their areas." At Company F, security has collaborated internally with the Legal, Audit, Value
Chain, Risk Management, and Business Continuity Planning departments to form a Loss
Control Committee that tracks supply chain related losses.
Company L also created a North American Security Council, whose purpose is to
bring everyone from legal to procurement to quality to distribution, manufacturing and
transportation together to discuss and make sure people have security on their radar screen."
This model has worked well in North America, specifically dealing with C-TPAT issues, and
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they are in the process of developing similar councils in countries throughout their global
supply chain.
This internal collaboration often leads to improved training and awareness. Company
M has charged a wholly owned-subsidiary charged with supply chain compliance across a
variety of areas including security. This subsidiary collaborates with security, sourcing, and
transportation, and develops training and development guides for their field personnel with
support from their supply chain partners. When they decided to conduct security training for
personnel charged with loading containers, for example, they asked their distributors to
identify best practices and suggestions, and adopted some of these for their own programs.
Another area where some progressive security groups collaborate internally is with
sourcing. At Company Q, for example, Security created a reputation for collaboration through
assisting the Legal Department, their parent division, with items such as investigations. As a
result of these collaborative successes, security has been asked to conduct other functions,
such as providing input into choosing service providers. This opportunity to provide input on
potential suppliers has allowed security to become part of the strategic process. According to
their Director of Security, "a large part of our success at [Company Q] relates to the quality of
our security staff and how integrated we are with other business units."
Company S also collaborates internally on logistics decisions. According to Company
S's Director of Supply Chain Security, "I view logistics as my customer. 100% of my time is
devoted to supply chain security, so I have an intensive amount of interaction with them."
This manifests itself in several ways. Company S's security personnel get involved in the
request for quote (RFQ) process, and no decisions are made regarding selection of a provider
without security's input. Company S will also not consider entering a just in time (JIT) hub,
unless the location has been screened and accepted by their security program. Company T
also provides input to their transportation department regarding sourcing decisions. According
to their Manager of Operations and Investigations, "we now are able to support our
transportation partners by saying you know a certain merchant, it's not a good idea going
there because of a security point of view."
The second level of collaboration involves industry-wide initiatives. Security officers
often collaborate with their counterparts across different industries through security-specific
associations such as the International Security Management Association (ISMA) or the
Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). Many companies have also entered into
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collaborative partnerships with their direct competitors to identify problems, solutions, and
best practices regarding security issues facing their industry.
Company E, for example, collaborates with other automotive manufacturers and
suppliers through the Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG), a group that has been in
existence since 1982 to discuss quality issues. Company U, along with other small parcel
carriers, participates in the Postal and Shipping Coordination Council. This group has helped
to open doors for communication in the event of a security related incident.
Both Company M and Company N address security issues through an industry group
called Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA). RILA's goal is to "bring the key
executives from the most innovative and successful retail and product manufacturer
companies in the industry together in unique forums to learn from each other and industry
experts, advocate for the best course of action in public policy for the industry, and work to
advance the reputation of the retail industry as a whole" (RILA website, 2005). Company 0
works closely with the World Shipping Council to discuss security issues. The World
Shipping Council is an association representing the liner shipping industry whose member
lines operate more than 90% of the industry's vessel tonnage serving America's foreign
commerce (World Shipping Council Website, 2005).
Company K is a member of the Technology Asset Protection Association (TAPA), an
association of security professionals and related business partners from high technology
companies who have organized for the purpose of addressing the emerging security threats
that are common to the technology industry (TAPA website, 2005). Company I has also
worked with TAPA and the Alliance for Gray Market and Counterfeit Abatement (AGMA) to
combine data from several companies to conduct statistical analyses of losses.
Despite these collaborative efforts, companies differ in their view of security as a
competitive advantage. Company 0, for example, will eagerly share information if they feel
that sharing will serve a useful purpose for them. When the 24-Hour Rule was initiated (see
Appendix A for a brief description of this program), they openly shared the process they
created to manage the immense documentation issues. They shared information because the
new rule posed such a threat to the industry, that they recognized that helping other
companies deal with it effectively would positively affect their business. Company E
collaborates with other automotive companies on security issues; however, they treat their
security best practices as a competitive advantage and therefore do not share them.
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Finally, companies collaborate at different levels with government authorities.
Company C, for example, has its own, fully deputized law enforcement force that often
partners with state and federal authorities to ensure secure operations during rail incidents or
special events. Company E works closely with the U.S. Coast Guard and the State Police at
their corporate headquarters to share security related information. Company E has also
allowed law enforcement agencies to put antennas on the roof of their highest buildings, they
make a point to meet with local police departments regularly, and they use their 24-hour crisis
information center to produce a global daily intelligence bulletin that goes to all of their
executives as well as law enforcement partners.
At Company A, one of their directors in the Asset Protection group has formed a
relationship with officials at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and various
government agencies charged with protection of America's food supply. These officials
contact him often to discuss new threats and regulatory issues. According to their VP for
Asset Protection, "the Chairman understands how important it is to our business to have
someone plugged into D.C. with the credibility and respect and they know if they call him,
they will get the truth."
Not all companies, however, find collaboration with government beneficial. Marine
carriers, in particular, expressed concern about the government's influence on their
operations. Company B, for example, struggles with whether or not to collaborate with the
government, due to their experience with government's erratic responses to security incidents
in the past. Company 0 also expressed frustration at the inability to predict the government's
response to potential threats. One example of an incident that caused concern is the 2004
"Lemongate" incident that took place outside the Port of New York and New Jersey. In this
incident, an email sent to the U.S. Department of Agriculture indicated that a shipment of
lemons on a ship bound for the U.S. could be contaminated with a biological agent. As a
result of this email threat, the ship containing the lemons was forced to sit outside the port for
seven days while various government agencies determined the best course of action.
In addition to these concerns, two companies indicated concerns about reporting
information to the government. Company B has received multiple government contacts that
they are required to notify to report an incident or intelligence-related information. This has
reduced their confidence that intelligence information is being well managed behind the
scenes. Company 0 indicated that their personnel will often provide U.S. Customs with
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suspicious information, but that they rarely received feedback notifying them of how a
particular issue was resolved. This lack of consistency has reduced these companies'
confidence that incident reporting is being effectively managed by the U.S. government.
4.1.4 Business Continuity Planning Integration Initiatives
Most companies we spoke with have a Business Continuity Planning (BCP) program.
BCP programs have historically focused on information technology, but are more recently
expanding beyond these boundaries. BCP programs are charged with maintaining operations
through implementing responses to disruptions. This effectively inserts resilience into a
company's operations, including its supply chain. Since BCP affects all areas of the company,
ownership of the BCP program is often assigned to cross-functional committees at the
executive level. Because of the cross-functional nature of BCP programs, however, ownership
is often ambiguous. These cross-functional committees identify potential threats and
vulnerabilities and craft exercise disruption scenarios to identify potential response and
mitigation efforts. Responsibility for these exercises usually falls on the shoulders of local or
regional emergency response or crisis management groups that report to the BCP leadership.
These emergency response groups are managed at the regional, country, or local level, and
focus more on immediate crisis response and less on actual resumption of all business
functions.
The degree of interaction between security and business continuity programs at both
the corporate and field level varies greatly. The majority of companies recognize that security
and business continuity should go hand in hand, and work together to develop plans at the
executive level. Some companies do admit, however, that their BCP program is an area that
needs much improvement.
The companies with strong BCP programs recognize the need for buy-in from all
departments, including security, to respond to a crisis situation and ensure continuity of the
business. At Company I, for example, safety, security and contingency planning work closely
together to ensure the safety of their personnel during a crisis. At Company Q, the security
program has initiated their company's business continuity efforts, utilizing their Global
Security Operations Center to draft a generic business continuity plan that can be modified for
each site to address crisis management, crisis recovery, and business continuity planning.
Company U uses a Crisis Management Committee, either chaired or co-chaired by security, to
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respond to disruptions. This Committee is made up of representatives from the Risk
Management, HR, Operations and Legal departments. Subdivisions within the committee deal
with every discipline in the company. At Company K, security actually owns the emergency
management program and provides infrastructure to help the emergency operations centers
respond.
Company C's centralized BCP program addresses two types of crises: immediate
disasters, for example, from fires or computer viruses, and those with some advance warning,
such as hurricanes or planned system disruption. At this centralized level, security is
integrally involved with relocating work to other areas, starting up in an initially unsecured
environment, and getting security measures in place once the business is up and running. On
the local side, Company C's decentralized facilities rely heavily on local plans. As a result,
when disaster strikes a yard or terminal, the Company C police force and Regional Response
Teams are the first responders. A good example of this type of response was during a tunnel
fire in a major metropolitan area. During this incident, Company C security personnel worked
closely with the local police department to ensure rapid and effective response to the fire.
Company C's departments worked closely together during the response, taking a conservative
approach to ensure the safety of city's people and surroundings.
Company E also integrates their business continuity and security programs through
their emergency response group and business response group, who manage local business
resumption plans and emergency response teams respectively. The emergency response and
business resumption groups run annual tabletop drills for each group that address crises of all
kinds, including transportation, fire, etc. A tabletop drill is one where parties meet to discuss
their potential response to a given scenario, but do not actually act anything out physically.
These exercises are conducted locally, and escalated as necessary. If a local response team
cannot handle a crisis, management moves up to country and regional teams. A corporate
emergency response teams exists for the more extreme responses, and it integrates the CEO
and the Legal, Human Resources (HR), and Information Technology (IT) departments to
tackle the most difficult of situations. Company E also utilizes their 24-hour crisis center to
help coordinate responses.
Not all companies have BCP programs that are integrated with security. Some have
extensive security and business continuity programs, but that only interact when making
recommendations to each other. At Company M, for example, BCP falls under the Logistics
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Group, and their wholly owned subsidiary that is charged with implementing and enforcing
security regulations only gets involved when making recommendations of potential scenarios
to consider in their plans. At Company G, the business continuity program historically
resided in the IT department, but they recently initiated a pilot program to include all aspects
of getting a facility up and running again, including the IT, Facilities, HR, and Security
departments. Although this initiative is not spearheaded by the security program, they have
remained involved.
Many companies recognize the need for integration with BCP, and that their particular
programs need improvement. Company J, for example, has a strong emergency planning and
response planning group, but their focus on business continuity is only really robust in the IT
department. According to their Director of Security, "that's an area where, using some of
[MIT's] specific research, as a matter of fact, we've been able to convince the integrated
supply chain that they need to have a continuity plan for that entire organization." Despite the
lack of initiative in that area, security does feel that they will be a member of that team when
it happens.
Company B is another company that feels that their BCP program needs improvement.
According to their VP of Security, "we do have business continuity plans in place.. .but it's an
area that [Company B] really needs to beef up.. .we've spent a lot of time on the critical
locations, but not so good a job in terms of the less critical. I personally believe we need to
refocus our efforts and do a better job in that area."
4.2 Human Resources Practices
This section describes two important human resources practices that affect supply
chain security programs: employee background screening and distribution and duties of
security personnel.
4.2.1 Employee Background Screening
One of the most significant aspects of instilling a cultural value in an organization
involves selecting personnel who have values that inherently align with those of the
organization, or who demonstrate the capability to adjust accordingly. While it is standard
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practice at many companies to conduct a background screening process that examines
employees' personal background and former employment, some take this screening to a
higher level and include personality tests. The results of this background screening process
allow the employers to determine if the employee would be a good fit within the organization
and its culture. Although many companies already utilize background screening to make the
most effective hires, C-TPAT has brought the issue to the attention of security executives for
the purposes of their own companies and their suppliers. C-TPAT includes employee
background screening as an important requirement of their validation process.
Company J, for example, used to apply background screening criteria only to their
own personnel in their facilities, but they have recently extended this, as permitted by law, to
their suppliers' employees. They have also used C-TPAT as a vehicle for requiring their
suppliers to conduct background checks on their employees. According to their Director of
Security, "the possibility that one of our products or shipments could be used as a conveyance
for something other than our product has caused us to look at [background screening]
completely differently."
Extending background screening to suppliers is important, but not widely practiced.
The Director of Import Operations at Company R describes this dilemma, "obviously we do
background checks as part of our response, we go through more than routine background
checks for all employees that we hire, but the issue is what about subcontractors and third
party providers... we do it, but it doesn't help us doing that in the U.S. because we have to
push out the borders."
Another aspect of employee selection is seeking specific experience that will bring
desired competencies to the company. This method is used primarily to identify strong
candidates for security-specific positions within a company. At Company F, for example, the
VP of Corporate Security formerly worked for the U.S. State Department. This position
provided him with a skill set that has worked well with the company's corporate objectives.
As a result, Company F continues to seek out personnel who have worked internationally, and
specifically within the State Department. Company T also seeks personnel with international
experience, and a variety of law enforcement experience, including the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. military. They feel that
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this wider variety of experience, combined with international exposure, result in a level of
comfort with the global nature of Company T's business.
When looking to hire security-specific personnel, Company K pulls from the premiere
law enforcement agency of regions where they operate. They do this because they recognize
that their background will bring invaluable country-specific knowledge to the job. According
to their Director of Security, "it's not going to do any good for someone with my [American]
background to talk to Israel; you need linkages back to the country."
Sometimes a company may not require specific experience, but may seek out aptitude
in areas important to their security program. Company Q's Global Security Group, for
example, seeks out people with investigative experience who are comfortable conducting risk
assessments and investigations, or who show aptitude to learn those competencies. They also
look for personnel with certifications, such as Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), as proof of competencies.
4.2.2 Distribution and Duties of Security Personnel
Security personnel are globally distributed across regions and countries to meet
security objectives. While the distribution and duties of personnel differ on some levels,
common themes present themselves. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, the corporate security
program usually resides at corporate headquarters, with security personnel scattered
throughout global facilities as warranted. Most companies also have full time security
managers at the regional or country level.
Security personnel located at facilities are either full or part time, depending on the
location, size, risk, and activity of each facility. Part time security personnel often hold other
responsibilities, usually Safety or Human Resources. As we see throughout this study and
discussed in Section 4.1.1.1, safety duties align well with security duties since they overlap in
many areas. The most significant of these areas is providing a safe and secure workplace. A
secondary reason why these duties often overlap is their regulatory nature. Personnel that are
used to navigating complex safety regulations such as OSHA standards, or people in the
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Human Resources department who deal with regulatory issues every day, are easily able to
understand security guidelines that may be imposed based on corporate or C-TPAT standards.
At Company F, for example, each principal manufacturing site has a full time security
manager, but at their smaller facilities and those of their partners, the security manager is a
collateral duty for another manager on site. These collateral duty managers hold a number of
different positions, including HR, Finance, Administration, and Environmental Health and
Safety (EHS). Company B maintains a small corporate security group, regional security
managers, and many field personnel. The field personnel are either full time or collateral duty,
depending on the size of the facility.
Company J uses a different model, maintaining that security is the responsibility of each
and every employee. As a result, they do not have dedicated security personnel, but rather
integrated supply chain employees who have security as one of their many responsibilities.
According to the Director of Security, " through many years of experience, I've found that if
you have a separate function or organization having that responsibility, and they are separate
from the entity or the particular division that we're trying to protect, it does not work."
At Company 0, the security program has the ability to promote as many regional or
country security officers as they see fit. Instead of picking a number and trying to reach that,
they actually look for people who are competent advocates for security, and assign them the
position. They then empower that person to employ as many people as necessary within the
organization to get the job done.
Some companies contract out their security personnel to third party providers, while
others feel that they have more control when the security personnel are direct employees of
the corporation. At Company E, for example, they outsourced their global security function in
North America to a security provider. When they initially outsourced, they experienced a
communication disconnect. They eventually realized that this was due to the lack of a
Company E manager in place to oversee the third party personnel. As a result, they put
regional and division security supervisors in place who worked with the third party to ensure
that the company's security objectives were being met.
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Company U also does not like to use outside contractors for their security positions,
because they feel that it takes outsiders a long time to understand their business. They also
feel that part of an effective security program is working with people, making contacts, and
cultivating sources for intelligence. According to their Director of Security, "you have to
know your operation; it's like a police officer on the beat. Most crimes aren't solved by crime
scene investigation-type of work...most good cops have a couple of sources that they can rely
on, and we try to employ the same type of strategy, to get close to the people."
4.3 Education
Supply chain security-focused education takes place on two important levels,
internally within the company, and externally with a company's suppliers.
4.3.1 Employee Education
Every company we spoke with conducts some type of employee education regarding
security. At the most basic level, this training takes place as part of the new employee
orientation program, where security is included as one module among many. Employees must
attend this training, or sign a document stating that they have read and understood the
company policy on security, within a specified time period from the initiation of their
employment.
Many companies we spoke to have taken this security education further and required
that all their employees participate in regularly scheduled security training. The Internet is a
very useful tool in administering training to all employees throughout a company. Internet
training is available at any time, allows employees to conduct the training when convenient
for their schedule, and provides an accurate record of when employees completed the training.
Company I, for example, requires each employee to take an on-line environmental,
health, safety and security course that provides the employee with background information on
each program, defines their responsibilities, and provides them with resources and contacts
for assistance. At Company B, all corporate personnel must take an Internet-based security
training module, while terminal personnel follow standards set by the Maritime
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Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2001 and the International Ship and Port Security
Code (ISPS) (See Appendix A for brief descriptions of these programs). Company Q requires
general security training for their new hires, and they offer a security awareness course for
voluntary training. They only administer this training if requested, however, since they feel
that it is most effective of the people being trained really want to learn.
Company L offers an online training program based on commercial software. This
program includes five modules that employees must complete within 30 days of employment.
This training is then supplemented with annual training seminars. At Company 0, nobody is
allowed to continue with their job after the 30-day mark without having taken a C-TPAT
awareness course. This consists of a three hour online course that provides a description of the
history of terrorism, the C-TPAT program, and their company's role in the program. This
course also requires a test at the end, and employees must receive 80% or more to pass.
Despite Company S's heavily supply chain-focused strategy, they realized that their
general employees didn't have a solid concept of what supply chain means. They therefore
created a training program focused solely on supply chain. This 24-hour course, which
includes a security module, was initially created for executives, but is now offered to all
Company S employees upon request.
In addition to conducting corporate security training at headquarters, some companies
travel to their global facilities to conduct regular training with field security personnel.
Company F, for example, conducts security road shows on a regular basis. They have had
more than 100% participation in these trainings, meaning that security employees are bringing
their bosses to learn about security. Company I also recently started a regional training
program where they bring all their site security officers together to conduct training on a
broad range of issues, from physical security to workplace violence.
Companies without a substantial security budget or personnel must rely primarily on
socialization to imbue the importance of security into their employees' decision making
process. Company R, for example, has a limited security budget. As a result, they've tried to
socialize security, instead of enlisting third party firms to get them into compliance with C-
TPAT or conduct audits. According to their Director of Import Operations, "when C-TPAT
occurred...we didn't have much of a budget so we tried to socialize it more to use our existing
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resources." Company J has also focused on socialization to educate their suppliers, rather than
using an iron hand. They feel that this approach has been much more effective, especially
with their suppliers.
4.3.2 Supplier Education
In addition to educating their own employees, many companies have made great
efforts to educate their suppliers. As discussed further in Section 4.1.2, many companies now
put C-TPAT security requirements in contracts with suppliers. This has resulted in improved
supplier understanding of security expectations. For some companies, the security education
stops there. Certain proactive companies have taken it a step further, however, to ensure that
their suppliers understand the importance of security throughout the organization.
This additional effort often comes in the form of supplier conferences. These are held
at overseas facilities, or in a neutral location where all the security personnel from a certain
country or region can gather to conduct training. Company J, for example, held an Asian
supplier conference where they intended to "scare their suppliers into action." They used this
training opportunity to discuss threats, supplier experiences, security measures, and prior
incidents. Throughout this program, they purposely made it a point to not focus on C-TPAT,
since many of their suppliers didn't know what that was, but to focus more on their company-
specific security requirements. As a result of this training, security personnel formed work
groups that continue to address security issues throughout the region.
Company G conducted a similar conference with 130 of their Asian suppliers. In order
to increase buy-in from the suppliers, they invited local government officials to the training.
Company M conducts several levels of training with their suppliers in country groups of
factories, and with individual factories that struggle. They do this because they feel that
"audit-only training programs are ridiculous, and that 80% of effort in all successful programs
should be in the training."
Company E maintains a strong focus on educating their suppliers about security. They
require all of their logistics carriers to be C-TPAT certified, but they understand that by doing
so, they have to assist them with compliance. Company E has therefore used C-TPAT as a
vehicle for getting suppliers to conduct self-assessments of their own security programs. They
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are trying to promote C-TPAT objectives to their suppliers as well, but recognize the
difficulty in this since often their suppliers serve many other companies.
Company S conducts extensive security training with their freight forwarders, in the
hopes that they will in turn educate their suppliers. Their goal is to ensure that when any of
their forwarders' personnel are handling Company S product, they are thinking of security.
According to Company S's Director of Supply Chain Security, "if this disconnect [between
Company S and their forwarders] is visible to the customer, I pay the bill."
4.4 Measurement Systems
Measurement systems are necessary to quantify the success of security programs. Two
forms of measurement stood out during our research, the use of financial analysis and
auditing. Companies use financial analysis to determine what areas need the most attention,
and the effectiveness of existing measures. Audits help to ensure that security standards are
being followed, and provide visible reminders to employees of the importance of adhering to
the security program.
4.4.1 Financial Analysis
Many of the companies we interviewed use financial analysis to justify security
investments, although specific analytical methods vary widely. In general, those companies
that feel security must be viewed as part of the business realize that they must rely on analysis
to make their case to corporate leadership. Another purpose of conducting financial analysis is
to formally tie security into the company's overall objectives. Some of these analyses include
risk assessment, cost of delays due to security inspections, measurement of historical or
potential losses in order to identify high-risk areas ripe for mitigation, and use of Six SigmaTM
methods to analyze security-specific incidents.
The Investigations Manager at Company D, a Certified Public Accountant (CPA),
conducts his financial analysis primarily through quantifying the cost of delays of raw
material and finished product at borders, as well as potential losses through gray market
diversion. He states "I've tried to make security concerns a part of the business process to
show that a good approach to security problems can lead to one of two things: a safer working
environment and a better financial outlook long term."
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Company T has put extensive time and effort into measuring the cost of border delays
and its effect on the company's bottom line. They have assessed the direct cost of inspection
delays at border crossings per container, including forecasts of their projected container
growth. These numbers based on delay alone are significant, and would most likely increase
substantially when you add in the harder to quantify indirect cost to the overall company for
not getting product on time. Company S, for example, estimates that indirect costs affect the
company's bottom line 5-7 times more than the direct loss to the company.
Some additional steps Company T has taken include securing a promise from the
company President that if a supplier is not adhering to their security requirements, they will
cease to do business with them. They have also pursued technology such as radio frequency
identification (RFID) that has a clear business purpose, and provides increased security as a
by-product. According to their Manager of Operations and Investigations, "our first job is
definitely security, but our focus is in the business in terms of sourcing and selling."
Company J relies on an in-depth incident tracking system to demonstrate the need for
security to upper management. They can provide incident data on a real-time basis to different
groups in the company indicating problems in their line of business, and how can they work
with them to address them. Their Director of Security feels that this works better than a
person from the security group coming in and saying, 'I have a law enforcement background
so you should listen to me.' According to this Director, "we find it is critical that you're an
integral part of business and can show the value added to your client in terms of them taking
advantage of the security resources we bring to the table."
Company J has also used C-TPAT to broaden their security program beyond the
logistics process. For example, as part of the C-TPAT validation process, Company J
analyzed their U.S.-Mexico border crossing procedures and realized that, from a security
standpoint, they were utilizing too many storage yards for trucks waiting to cross the border.
As a result, they decided to combine their yards. This decision not only helped them ensure
the security of their trucks, but also increased efficiency of the border-crossing process.
According to their Director of Security, "ultimately we believe we're going to help the
business not only from a security standpoint, but also from the standpoint of identifying
business efficiencies by focusing attention on supply chain security."
52
At Company A, The VP of Asset Protection states that the company is very driven by
return on investment (ROI) driven, but that their senior management treats the soft benefits of
certain investments, such as safety and security, as equally important as financial numbers. As
an example, they described an initiative to install digital closed circuit television (CCTV)
systems in all of their retail stores, even those that have not recently been renovated or
remodeled. Although this might cost the company tens of millions of dollars, they have been
able to present the additional benefits of digital CCTV to the company, and they feel 85%
sure that the initiative will be passed. This VP states, "if the senior executives didn't hold
[security] in such high priority, I don't know that we would be able to accomplish everything
we have since 9/11. A lot has to do with buy-in of upper management."
Company A's security program was also recently moved under the Supply Chain
Group. This move was made because the analytically driven Supply Chain Group is very
could provide resources to help quantify the impact and ROI of various security initiatives.
Some methods of doing this include measuring the effect of various preventative strategies on
losses, and how these would impact the success of failure of various initiatives. This process
has always been used within the company for food safety, but more recently for security.
Many security groups have taken the risk assessment function on internally, relying on
instead of relying solely on centralized corporate risk assessment groups. Company I, for
example, has found that expressing potential losses through statistical methods is very
difficult, so they have focused on measuring actual losses. As a result, they have been able to
demonstrate very solid numbers about what has been lost, and how security measures have
reduced losses. They have also employed trending and analysis based on information from
their global claims database to identify high-risk areas. In one instance, they were able to
identify that their trucks were being targeted at rest areas within a 200-mile radius of a
specifically vulnerable area. This risk assessment allowed them to implement policies for
drivers to not stop at rest areas within these 200 miles, greatly reducing losses in that area.
Company F uses a spreadsheet-based tool called an "asset protection tool" to identify
areas requiring security investments at the local level. This tool is used widely throughout the
company to rank security measures at facilities. Five versions of the tool exist, for use at
different facilities such as manufacturing, transportation, or commercial office spaces. Use of
this tool has become so widespread that employees regularly discuss their "asset protection
tool" scores, and these scores are included in performance evaluations. Company F has also
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built use of this tool into contracts with their suppliers, some of whom have used it to make
operational decisions surrounding their facilities. In addition to this tool, Company F has a
multidisciplinary Loss Control Committee that tracks supply chain related losses to "get better
visibility against what we're losing, where we're losing it, why and how, as well as to develop
counter measures." This Committee includes representatives from the Security, Value Chain,
Legal, Audit, and Risk Management departments.
Despite efforts to quantify the effect of security on the company's bottom line, some
companies indicate that they have received less support since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. At Company E, for example, they had no problems justifying security
expenditures post September 11, 2001, but as time passes it has gotten more difficult. They
look closely at government programs such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to justify
expenditures based on security benefits from tracking their material. According to their
Security Administrator, "to justify expenditures, if they say you can save money because
you're tracking your supplies, then logistics can use that type of savings to justify the
expense, and we acquire security as a by-product." They also state that security expenditures
are much more easily justified when beginning a project, rather than modifying an existing
facility or process.
Several companies conduct financial analyses, but always view security as a cost-
added function. Company F, for example, uses their "asset protection tool" as described above
to drive local spending, but they say these efforts "are never going to get a return on
investment." The VP for Security at Company B also thinks that arguments for security
improving efficiency "are good in terms of hypothetical, theoretical, conceptual
thinking... [but] I can't give too many examples of security initiatives that make us more
efficient."
Only one company we spoke with clearly views security as a revenue provider.
Company 0 maintains that additional security costs to comply with C-TPAT and other
security regulations since September 11, 2001 have amounted to less than $1 per twenty foot
equivalent unit (TEU). These costs, however, have been outstripped by additional revenue
that has been brought in through marketing security as a new service area. According to
Company O's Security Officer, "[security] has created a new product line for us. In fact, any
cost that we've had to date has had an equaling return on investment, so as of this
moment.. .we've been able to cost justify any expenses."
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Company P has also seen some unexpected benefit from increased security
regulations. They initially feared that the 24-Hour Rule would constitute a huge added cost to
the company (see Appendix A for a brief description of this program). They did incur costs to
comply with the program, for example opening a 24-hour operations center, but as a result
they no longer have to chase their customers for information, or print dummy bills of lading
with incomplete information. Instead of increasing costs, the rule has forced Company P and
their customers to be much more efficient in their documentation processes, which has
reduced company costs. The company has used the success of this initiative as an example to
gain strength for other security initiatives.
Another method used to conduct analysis, although not specifically financial, is Six
SigmaTM. Two firms we spoke with have adopted Six SigmaTM practices to analyze security
incidents affecting their firms. Company I analyzes security events using 7-step problem
solving, to determine why the event occurred and what corrective actions should be put in
place to prevent reoccurrence. For example, when they encountered security issues in the
warranty program, they formed a team of business and security personnel to meet with a high
level quality Six SigmaTM-trained Black Belts to resolve the problems. The results of this
analysis were presented to the senior level of management, and will be used to create
additional programs and processes in this space. The use of these methods aligns well with
certain aspects of their corporate culture, specifically the company's analytical nature rooted
in its engineering heritage.
Company S also uses Six SigmaTM methodology to address security issues. For
example, they have used root cause analysis of the losses over a period of years, to come up
with security requirements language to use in their contracts. All Company S executives must
attend Brown and Black Belt level training, so security issues are understood across the
company when using this common language. According to their Supply Chain Security
Director, "we're a very metrics driven company, we subscribe very heavily to the Six
SigmaTM methodology, and in order to be a Director at Company S, you have to have taken
the 160 hour Six SigmaTM Black and Brown Belt level course... It helps all of us understand
what the cost impacts are. We measure everything."
Some companies do not conduct financial analysis at all. Company M has not
bothered conducting financial analysis of the effectiveness of security measures, since they
feel that any delay is unacceptable and that further analysis would be a waste of time.
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Company G indicated that they have not used financial analysis since nobody from the
corporate leadership has asked for it. Finally at Company L, they purposely do not conduct
centralized financial analysis so that security spending decisions remain at the local level.
4.4.2 Audits
The majority of companies we interviewed conduct some form of auditing to ensure
that their security program standards are being applied and followed. Audit teams are usually
composed of corporate personnel who are either located full time overseas and conduct
regular audits, or who travel to each global location from a central location on regular
intervals. Some companies hire third parties to conduct these audits, but the majority keeps
control of the audits within the company. Many of the companies we interviewed have added
to their existing financial, safety, or quality auditing programs to address security
requirements. These teams are trained in basic security principles, and have added security
items to their existing audit checklists. This technique has allowed many companies to obtain
C-TPAT compliance with limited costs.
Company G, for example, utilizes an existing quality assurance (QA) auditing team
who visits their facilities in the Far East four to five times a year. They initially hired a third
party to conduct their security audits, but realized that the quality of their internal audits
exceeded those of the third party so they discontinued the use and cost of these extra
personnel. At Company L, the security program has capitalized on the quality principles
engrained in their culture this to meet security objectives, specifically through the auditing
process. They have trained quality auditors, who already regularly visit their global facilities,
to be aware of security issues.
Company M has trained their administrative and financial auditing teams in security
practices, and they feel that utilizing this existing resource has helped them implement C-
TPAT requirements with minimal cost. Company B also conducted training with their
financial auditing team to observe security practices during their facility visits. This company,
however, purposefully uses third party auditors, in addition to their internal audit teams, to
conduct security-specific audits. Their goal in this process is to ensure that security issues are
not overlooked by Company B auditors who are extremely familiar with each facility. At
Company D, the global safety auditor who regularly visits all of their facilities looks at
physical security items and reports back to headquarters regarding any significant issues. If he
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does find a significant issue, the manager for special investigations will visit the facility,
along with the global safety auditor, to address it.
Company A conducts asset protection audits that deal with such issues as security, store
sanitation, and food safety. They use these audits to train managers on their responsibilities in
each area. The process they use includes familiarizing managers with the audit program,
conducting a mock audit, and then encouraging managers to conduct self audits in order to
identify areas of weakness. According to their VP of Asset Protection, the "goal of an audit is
not to catch people doing things wrong, but to catch them doing things right." In this industry,
where high turnover is common, this audit process has proven to be a useful tool to keep
employees aware of security responsibilities.
Only one company explicitly addressed expanding their auditing capabilities from
their facilities to those of their suppliers. Company F has done this through securing the right
to audit and conduct investigations at their suppliers' facilities. They have worked internally
with their Value Chain department to ensure that when their security auditors arrive at their
supplier's doorstep, there will be a previously arranged understanding of their intentions.
4.5 Communication
Effective communication is fundamental in conveying the importance of security to all
members of an organization. Every company in the study communicates their security
objectives to employees, customers, and suppliers using varying methods. One of the primary
means of communication is through company Intranet sites. Company sites are updated
regularly with security information, and employees are encouraged to access these sites on a
regular basis.
At Company 0, for example, if an important issue comes to the forefront of the
company's concerns, they will post a bulletin on their global homepage that can be accessed
by all of their employees. Company K uses a similar method, posting interesting issues or
cases on their internal corporate homepage, but their interface also allows employees to post
questions and receive answers electronically in a timely fashion. Other common methods of
communication include security briefs, reports, newsletters, and hotlines.
Some companies, specifically those with 24-hour operations centers, conduct routine
intelligence gathering and disseminate intelligence updates to their employees, external
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partners, and government authorities as necessary. This is especially helpful for companies
with scattered global operations to keep apprised of political happenings near their facilities.
Company E, for example, distributes intelligence information to their executives and local law
enforcement on a regular basis. Company T also globally distributes regular intelligence
bulletins that track international incidents in the countries where they operate, as well as
activity surrounding U.S. embassies or major religious buildings near their facilities. One
example of the success of this process took place in Jakarta in 2004. The company's
operations center decided to focus on Australia, when they heard that elections would be
happening there in the near future. At the same time, they noticed an increase of related
activity in Jakarta, and sent a message about that to their office there. The next day, a suicide
bomb went off outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta.
Regardless of the methods used to communicate security information, many
companies expressed the importance of communication as a key factor in the success of their
security program. Company D, for example, communicates security information to their
employees through a safety and security hotline, email notices, and General Safety
Committees that are located at each facility. When a security issue arises, such as creating a
corporate drug testing policy or responding to a specific threat, they use these channels to
communicate with their employees, exchange valuable information, and identify best
solutions. Their Investigations Manager sums up their overall philosophy with "the more you
tell [the general population], they more you find out about what you want to know."
Company F regards communication as one of the five pillars of their security program.
This communication focus includes a robust internal corporate website and monthly emailed
travel advisories, as well as regular security briefings at facilities. This focus on
communication has "removed the whole idea of 'nobody ever told me,' or 'we've always
done it that way.'...people know where to go now, whereas before [security] was a bit more
nebulous or never addressed."
Company E relies heavily on their Communications Group, who has representatives at
each of their facilities, to distribute security related information to their employee base.
Company A has used the U.S. Food and the Drug Administration (FDA) guidance to build a
security awareness program for their stores. This program included a series of posters placed
in stores common areas depicting suspicious situations, and information with how to address
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them. Although Company A hasn't explicitly measured the campaign's effectiveness, their
VP of Assets Protection feels that it has definitely increased exposure.
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5 Espoused Values
Schein defines espoused values as strategies, goals, and philosophies, that when
combined form espoused justifications. An example of this might be a belief of a certain
group member that may or not become a group assumption until acted upon and/or proven, or
an organization's espoused values that may or may not be in line with what the company
actually does (Schein, 1992). As discussed in Section 2.2, espoused values often begin as the
reflection of someone's original values, for example the leader of an organization. It is not
until these espoused values are acted upon and tested by members of the organization that
they become shared values or beliefs.
Leadership, responsibility and value system are categorized under espoused values
because they dictate, either explicitly or through example, how members of the organization
should behave. The different levels of leadership within an organization embody role models
for the general population. The responsibilities assigned to the members of an organization
also help them to understand how they should behave, specifically during performance of
their duties. Finally, the value systems communicated to the general population of an
organization act as guidelines for use during the decision making process. The following
espoused values that apply to supply chain security are discussed in this chapter:
" Leadership
" Responsibility
o Placement in Corporate Structure




As discussed in Section 4.1.1, most companies have a corporate security program that
is led by a senior security official. The level of this person varies from company to company,
but they include Vice Presidents (VPs) and Directors, and are often considered an integral part
of the executive leadership.
When security officers are located one or two levels below the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) in the corporate hierarchy, they often make great efforts to maintain their voice
through direct communication with their leaders. For example, the VP for Corporate Security
at Company F reports directly to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), who sits on the CEO's
Operating Committee. This ensures that security is discussed at this committee on a regular
basis. At Company M, the security program reports to the Executive VP for Law, who is a
member of the senior leadership team, and also makes security a regular agenda item at each
meeting.
While the presence of a senior executive charged with security is important, the
general corporate leadership must also express commitment to their security agenda to all
levels of the company. At Company I, for example, every employee is provided with a
security policy that is signed by the CEO. This one page document describes the company's
philosophy and emphasizes the fact that security is everyone's responsibility and affects the
company's overall performance. At Company Q, the CEO holds security as a high priority
and communicates the importance of security to the organization on a regular basis.
Surprisingly, only about a quarter of the companies in the study identified support of the CEO
as an integral part of their program.
Company J includes security as a key part of their business conduct guidelines, and
employees are reviewed on the basis of these guidelines throughout their tenure, so they feel
that its importance is ingrained in every employee from day one. As a result of this
demonstrates commitment, the security program is viewed as driven from the Chairman and
CEO. At Company T, the Assets Protection Group has received commitment from the
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President of the company to sever relationships with suppliers who are not meeting security
requirements set forth in their contracts
At Company A, the Chairman himself made the decision to move the Assets
Protection program from reporting to the General Counsel to the Supply Chain Group. In
addition to this level of involvement, the results of asset protection audits are placed on an
executive level dashboard that has helped inspire other members of the senior leadership to
pay attention to security issues. According to their VP of Assets Protection, "if the senior
executives didn't hold [security] in such high priority, I don't know that we would be able to
accomplish everything we have since 9/11. A lot has to do with buy-in of upper
management."
5.2 Responsibility
Responsibility for security takes place at two distinct levels in the corporate structure.
The first level is the corporate security program that creates standards and conduct oversight
to ensure those standards are being followed. At this level, the security program's placement
in the corporate structure affects the way it is viewed by the company, and therefore its
leadership's ability to manage the program. At the local level, responsibility for overall
security falls on the general manager of a location who is also charged with all other aspects
of that locations performance. At this level, individual performance objectives play an
important role in security program implementation. In addition to individual performance
measures, incentives are also often used to encourage employees to embrace security
objectives.
5.2.1 Placement in Corporate Structure
There appears to be no standard reporting structure for corporate security programs.
Across the twenty-one companies interviewed in this study, security reports to ten different
corporate departments (Figure 5-1).
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Figure 5-1 Generalized Security Reporting Structures
CEO
Operations Finance Legal HR supply Quality Assets Corporate Govt. Admin
(B,O,U) (F,E,I) (C, E, J,,S) (L,E) Chain (G) Protection Services Policy (N)(A) (R,T) (K) (P)
Note: Letters represent companies with security reporting to that department. Security programs
reporting to multiple departments are included in each department, and companies where the
security program reporting structure is unknown are not included.
Three of the most common reporting relationships encountered were Finance,
Operations, and Legal departments. At Company F, for example, the VP of Corporate
Security reports to the CFO, because historically the security function of Company F grew out
of a risk management and theft prevention mindset. He also feels that his position under the
CFO has "fostered some reporting and communications that maybe weren't there before.
People know where to go now, whereas before it was a bit more nebulous or never
addressed." At Company I, the security program reports to the CFO, and security is therefore
considered a financial function. As a result, their Security Manager thinks that they are
structured as a group within the company to try and explore more of those business issues,
including counterfeit, gray market, supply chain, and warranty fraud.
At Company B, security falls under Operations. They view this as essential since they
are an operations driven company. This affiliation also allows the security leadership to be
taken seriously when making a recommendation to an operations manager, as opposed to if
the recommendation were coming from HR or another administrative group. At Company U,
their security program reports to the Senior VP for U.S. Operations, who is a member of the
Board of Directors and is the Senior Operations Manager reporting to the Chief Operating
Officer (COO). Security once resided under Business Development in that company, but they
shifted to Operations within the last four to five years because so much of what they do relies
on the operators' cooperation. At Company 0, security falls under Operations. According to
their Security Officer, this placement fits their objectives well because "security is really a
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business process issue, and finance and compliance people are generally lawyers and
accountants. How to secure the supply chain may not necessarily be in their toolkit."
Company C considers security a legal function. Their Executive VP for Law is
charged, among other things, with legal responsibilities, corporate communications,
compliance, and security. This placement fits well within the company, since they have a fully
deputized law enforcement group that often interfaces with local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies. Security at Company S also reports to the Legal department. Their
Director of Supply Chain Security feels that this location gives them "teeth" to do the things
they want to do, such as conducting investigations and being involved in contracting with
supply chain partners. He also feels that this placement is much more effective than human
resources or facilities would be. For example, in line with their legal function, Company S's
security personnel conduct almost 100% of the investigations that take place across the
company, from the IT department to the Audit department.
At Company P, the Director of Governmental Policy is charged with security, and he
reports directly to the CEO. After September 11, 2001, the company decided to give security
responsibilities to this Director, since they viewed security concerns as primarily a regulatory
problem that would require frequent interaction with the U.S. government. This Director then
appointed the senior business official in each region as the people charged with security,
because he felt that these people were already tied into the corporate culture, versus new
positions brought in from the outside.
Company E's security program reports jointly to the CFO, General Counsel, and
Human Resources department. This multiple reporting structure benefits security in different
ways, since their policy and procedures branch aligns closely with HR, while their
investigations arm aligns more closely with the Legal and Audit branches. The Security
Group at Company L also reports to the VP of Global HR Strategy, who then reports to HR.
They feel that this placement works well within the company, since HR is very influential in
the company. According to their Senior Director of Security, "typically not much gets done
without HR's blessing, they have a foothold on the organization, and they are pretty
powerful."
Company T has a designated Supply Chain Assets Protection (AP) Group. This group
contains three divisions: a stores environment, an operations environment, and a supply chain
environment. The larger AP Group is charged with ensuring the security of Company T's
64
people, products, and buildings throughout the world and relies on a culture of "safeness,"
which is discussed further in Section 4.1.1.1. The AP group has identified twelve different
groups within Company T that affect security, and they spend a lot of time coordinating with
these groups in order to maximize effectiveness.
Company M has created a wholly owned subsidiary as an independent organization
charged with implementing and enforcing compliance issues such as security, risk mitigation,
quality issues, labor standards, and country of origin laws. Company M formed this subsidiary
to ensure objectivity in their compliance processes. The Senior Vice President of this
subsidiary reports directly to the Executive VP of Company M, who is the President and CEO
of Company M's logistics services.
At Company A, security falls under the Asset Protection Group, who reports to the
Supply Chain Group. Before 2005, however, the security program reported to the General
Counsel. The Chairman of the company decided to make this shift since the Supply Chain
Group is run by a very analytically driven Executive VP. AP at Company A also includes
many responsibilities, including safety, food safety, environmental protection, quality
assurance and store sanitation. These functions are bundled together because they are all
compliance driven and require familiarity with working with regulatory agencies.
At Company K, security resides within Corporate Services which includes, among others,
Environmental, Health, and Safety, and Facility Based Services. This group resides under the
Technology and Manufacturing group, which is largest group at the company and is
responsible for manufacturing and delivering services associated with manufacturing the
product. Their Director of Security finds this placement beneficial because "it allows us to
interact with our customer base more efficiently. We're not beholden to legal aspects or HR,
we're seen as a service provider, rather than one business group in our organization."
5.2.2 Individual Performance Evaluations
Performance evaluations are a common measure of responsibility for employees. In
general, security-specific personnel within companies are regularly evaluated on their
adherence to security objectives, but this accountability rarely extends to the general
employees of the company. Some interviewees expressed an interest in requiring security
metrics to be included in employee performance objectives, but this does not appear to be
widespread.
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At Company U, their vehicle drivers are measured on security metrics, including
stolen vehicles and loss occurrences. Company U has a very low tolerance for security lapses,
and will terminate employment if they feel a driver has been negligent in adhering to security
protocol. At Company D, they feel that their focus on communication to convey the
importance of security to their employees imposes a certain level of responsibility on them.
Employees, if properly informed, cannot claim ignorance of a specific issue that has been
communicated to them numerous times through various channels.
At Company I, security is part of everyone's evaluations. Each employee is required to
take an on-line environmental, health, safety and security course, and completion of the
course is factored into performance evaluations. Company I has also introduced a security
component to their driver performance evaluations, especially in high risk areas. In areas
where security has been an issue, this change has resulted in behavioral change. According to
their Security Manager, "drivers say they have been written up for not following guidelines,
and they now appreciate what Security has been doing."
Another way that individuals or groups are judged on their performance of security
objectives is through financial incentives. Company N, for example, utilizes a corporate
program to influence employees' security actions. In this program, a certain percentage of
employees' compensation is based on meeting performance objectives at both the company
and individual level. Security objectives are included in this, so employees have a clearly
defined stake in whether they follow them. Company U, for example, offers a one-time
incentive program, where they will pay a $5000 reward to personnel who bring security
related information to the attention of the company. This program effectively communicates
the importance of security to Company U personnel, and provides incentives for them to
become more aware of their surroundings.
Company L has recently developed a security awareness initiative. This program
involves distributing brochures and other training materials to facilities, and provides a
website that employees can access to learn more about security concerns such as identity theft
and travel warnings. This program also offers an incentive system, where each facility may
make proposals to the corporate security group in order to make their facility more secure. If a
proposal is accepted, then the corporate group will help fund it. As an example, one site
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developed a streaming video Protection of Proprietary Information (POPI) program that was
funded partly by the corporate security group. Their Senior Director of Security feels that this
program has helped to spark individual involvement in reaching security objectives.
5.3 Value System
Many organizations provide their employees with an explicitly stated value system in
the form of a mission statement, motto, core values, or business conduct guidelines. These
items offer a clear and concise manifestation of the company's values that may be used to
provide motivation or help in the decision making process. Another less obvious measure of
a company's value system, is the overall corporate culture and how that is perceived by
employees. While many of the companies we spoke to could readily identify the former,
referring us to their company website or referring to a reminder card located within arm's
reach, most interviewees struggled to articulate the latter.
When asked about their corporate culture, in fact, most interviewees reached
immediately for a document stating their company's stated value system, or described their
culture as being aligned with a specific function, such as speed or flexibility. When pushed
further to discuss their perception of the corporate culture, the answers were slow to come and
varied widely in thought and clarity. It is important to note that one person's perception of
corporate culture says little about that culture, but it may be helpful to identify general
awareness in this area.
Company C's Assistant VP for Customer Service quoted a defined set of five core
values that is well articulated and communicated throughout the company, emphasizing items
such as customer service, focus on people, and safety. Company C also has a strong sense of
family that stems from the history of the railroad industry, where often great grandfathers,
grandfathers, mothers, sisters, and cousins all work for the railroad. This instills a sense of
pride that the interviewee feels sets Company C apart from other industries. When asked
about his company's culture, the Senior Director of Security at Company L referenced their
company's mantra, core values, and mission statement. These three messages combined focus
on such items as helping others, innovation, respect, quality, being a responsible citizen, and
being the consumer's first choice.
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Company B provides their employees with a security mission statement, which is a
subset of their overall mission statement. As a company, they view themselves as extremely
customer focused and supply chain focused. This is a result of the fact that they touch freight
at many instances along the supply chain (i.e. origin, destination, transport), and sometimes
even take custody of the freight from the manufacturer to the retail store. Security ties into
this process since they have moved to servicing many aspects of their customers supply
chains out of their customers' desires to use fewer providers, in large part for security reasons.
Company M's Senior VP aligns their perceived corporate culture with speed and
flexibility, two goals that reflect directly on their supply chain security practices. Security ties
to this through the potential for delays from increased border inspections. As a result, he states
that C-TPAT became a company priority "the minute it was viewed as an impediment to
speed," and if it hadn't intersected with flexibility and speed, "nobody would have cared."
According to Company I's Security Manager, their corporate culture focuses on the
customer and the community. They enforce these values through communications, action, and
training. As a demonstration of this commitment, Company I has an entire organization
dedicated to helping their employees help their customers with unanticipated or complex
problems. Security ties into this customer-focused value system through helping to ensure on-
time delivery of their products and overall customer satisfaction.
Company J has experienced a return to their basic beliefs, which include performing
every task in a superior manner, customer first, respect for the individual, and doing the right
thing. They feel that these beliefs align well with the security organization. Company J's
Director of Security indicates, "if there's the potential that a country or individuals in a
country could be harmed, then we step up and do the right thing and take that responsibility."
He feels that sets Company I apart from other companies who feel that if security doesn't
affect them, they should not care about it.
Company T has a strong culture of "safeness," which encompasses aspect of safety and
security. This concept differs from safety in that "safety is cleaning up spillage in the store so
someone does not fall over. Safeness is the well being of our guests when they come in the
store." This concept translates from the store to the workplace, in the form of wider aisles and
bright parking lot lighting, to tracking of executives traveling around the world. The concept
of safeness is so engrained in the company, that they even have a safeness manager.
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Company 0 is an Asian company with a strong focus on protecting the environment.
Their Security Group has capitalized on this by including security in their corporate
environmental structure and reporting process. According to their Security Officer, this has
been a "sneaky, or effective way, to weave within that culture some awareness of security."
Another aspect of Company O's culture is that they are very methodical, leaving no stone
unturned when approaching a new issue. As a result, the company sometimes takes longer
than their competitors to address an issue. Their Security Officer states that "[Company 0]
will be the best; they just won't be the best first."
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6 Basic Underlying Assumptions
Schein (1992) defines basic underlying assumptions as "unconscious, taken-for
granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings that are the ultimate source of values and
action." He further states that "culture as a set of basic assumptions defines for us what to pay
attention to, what things mean, how to reach emotionally to what is going on, and what
actions to take in various kinds of situations." Throughout the research process, three basic
underlying assumptions emerged that appear to support creation of a supply chain security
culture.
* Basic Assumption #1: That supply chain security affects employees' safety
o Employees believe that security affects their safety and would understand
the connection in the following example: if a shipment of product coming
from a manufacturer abroad is not adequately monitored during loading, a
biological agent could be introduced to the shipment. In this case of
terrorism, employees receiving the product at the U.S. distribution center
might be harmed when opening the shipment.
" Basic Assumption #2: That supply chain security affects employees' livelihood
o Employees believe that security affects their livelihood, and would
understand the connection, in the above example: if the biological agent in
the shipment did in fact harm employees or customers, this incident would
negatively affect the company's reputation, and most likely reduce market
share. Employees might therefore lose their jobs as a result of this incident
that could have been prevented with proper supply chain security.
* Basic Assumption #3: That security is the "right thing to do"
o Employees feel that security is the right thing to do, as demonstrated in the
above example: when personnel at the manufacturing facility decide
whether to ignore the security guidelines for loading procedures in order
to save time and increase productivity, or follow them to ensure proper
security. In this case, employees are faced with more than one "right thing
to do," increase productivity and ensure security. This dilemma is further
discussed in section 6.3.
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6.1 Security Affects Employees' Safety
The success of a company's security program rests on the actions of its employees.
The research suggests that if employees feel that security affects their personal safety, for
example that not following security guidelines will result in personal harm, they will make
decisions in accordance with the company's security objectives. This basic underlying
assumption is often facilitated by a strong existing safety culture.
Company D, for example, focuses on providing a work environment where employees
feel secure. According to their Investigations Manager, "if you provide employees with a safe
and secure working environment, you eliminate a whole host of issues." As an example of
this, when the company was considering instituting a mandatory drug-testing program, their
security manager used the existing General Safety Committee to discuss the issue with
employees. This openness helped the employees understand that the company was
implementing this program in order to create a safe and secure workplace, and they
unanimously approved the program.
At Company E, personnel safety is viewed as the number one priority, as evidenced by
safety videos required for all visitors, and safety briefings that begin every meeting, even
those occurring in an office setting. According to their Security Administrator, "it's been
drummed into the people at [Company E] that [security is] protection of our employees.. .we
look at the people as our biggest assets. So it's not only facilities, but protection of our people
too." As a result of this focus on safety, employees feel comfortable requesting, and praising,
increased security, for example in instances when the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) raises their Homeland Security Advisory System threat level (see Appendix A for a
brief description of this program).
Company T's Assets Protection Group's responsibilities include "safeness, theft, and
fraud." The concept of safeness falls between security and safety, and is described as "safety
is cleaning up spillage in the store so that someone does not fall over, safeness is the well
being of our guests when they come into the store." The concept of safeness applies equally to
employees and customers. Company T has an executive manager whose job is safeness, and
that manager projects the concept to their workforce through introductory security training for
new employees, and ongoing training on subjects such as workplace violence.
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6.2 Security Affects Employees' Livelihood
The research also suggests that instilling the basic underlying assumption that security
impacts employees' livelihood will motivate employees to embrace security principles. As
described in the example above, a tarnished reputation may affect the company's market share
and therefore employee compensation. In addition to this risk, poor security might result in an
incident so severe that a company goes out of business. Throughout this research, three
different approaches to motivate employees in this way were observed: focusing on protecting
the company's overall bottom line, focusing on protecting the customer, and focusing on
protecting the product.
Company K focuses on security's impacts to the company's bottom line. According to
their Director of Security, "where security might appear to contradict or conflict with what an
individual wants, we always have to provide the rationale behind it. But at the end of the day,
they employee knows we need to protect the intellectual property, our assets, and contribute
to the bottom line, so long as you're seen contributing to that, they are supportive."
One of Company S's corporate goals is to protect their assets, so they use whatever
strategy works to protect cargo theft from terrorism. In order to do this, the Director of Supply
Chain security has developed strategies for his group and its employees to have a better
understanding of the risks that their products are exposed to, and what it means to the
company when they lose product. For example, they communicate to employees an estimated
indirect cost of five to seven times the cost of a direct loss to the bottom line of the company.
Company A conducts security audits of each of their stores, observing items such as
check levels, cash levels, and shrink rates. They then expose all of their managers to the
results of these audits. This exposure forces the employees to understand that the financial
impact of poor security on the store. Employees then make the connection to their
compensation, because they know that merit increases and bonuses are directly tied into the
results of security audits.
Company J uses security's competitive advantage to convey its importance to their
personnel. According to their Director of Security, "we try to convey to our employee
population that it's a key to our competitiveness.. .that we have threats from terrorist
situations that might target multinational corporations like [Company J], and we try to convey
that it's in the individual's and corporation's best interest to do things in this area."
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Some companies focus on protecting the customer as the motivating factor for their
personnel. One common example of this is the prevalent adoption of C-TPAT, even in
companies that do not have a strong need for security. Although C-TPAT is voluntary',
companies have adopted the program because they know that if they do not, they believe that
their business may be impacted by increased delays and the inability to get product to their
customers on time. If they cannot get the products to their customers in a timely fashion, it
may affect their market share. Company G, for example, views themselves as a low-risk
importer with high volumes of low-value product that don't justify extensive security
investments. They realize, however, that if they do not comply with C-TPAT, they will no
longer be considered a low-risk importer and will be subject to additional inspections,
eventually affecting availability of product to their customer and their position in the market.
At Company I, their Security Manager states "our focus really is the customer and the
community, trying to be a good corporate citizen and the number one supplier to the customer
base. I think where security ties into that is through customer satisfaction model, making sure
the customer is receiving the product that they want on time." Company U also views their
company as customer service driven. They continually measure customer service levels and
customer satisfaction in order to remain conscious of their customers and the market in
general. This focus clearly communicates to employees that customer service has an impact
on the company's overall performance.
Some companies focus on protecting their product, because they recognize that poor
quality products could affect not only their brand, but in some cases, the health of their
customers. Companies in the food and pharmaceutical industries, for example, view security
as key to not only their competitiveness, but also to their long term viability. A public health
tragedy resulting from poor quality might mean dire consequences for the company, a very
direct threat that is visible to employees. According to Company Q's Director of Security,
"the number one issue that sets apart from other industries is public health. If somebody
counterfeits a pair of jeans, or a computer device, or a CD, nobody is going to fall ill. If you
do that to something you put in your body to alleviate an ailment, and you suffer an adverse
effect or worse, that kind of issue rocks this industry." Company A's VP for Asset Protection
echoes this sentiment. He states "our philosophy is if there is an issue going on with food
C-TPAT has been a voluntary program since its implementation in November 2001. As of March 2005, U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol has issued new C-TPAT guidelines which are still voluntary, but more stringent. See
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safety, we will always err on the side of safety versus cost to pull the merchandise. Our
Chairman, if he even thought we were thinking of costs, I'd be fired. He has told me that."
6.3 Security is "The Right Thing to Do"
During this study, interviewees were asked to describe their corporate culture and how
it relates to the company's security objectives. Many interviewees had a difficult time
communicating the tenets of their corporate culture, but approximately half of them indicated
that one aspect of their culture is "doing the right thing." When asked to clarify, interviewees
offered many descriptions of what this means, from providing a safe workplace, to being a
good corporate citizen, to supporting philanthropic efforts in their local community. The
basic underlying assumption that security is the right thing to do implies that when employees
are faced with a difficult decision involving security and they want to do the right thing, they
will choose the course of action resulting in the most secure supply chain.
Company F, for example, recently released a Code of Conduct as a result of a high-
profile prosecution of one of their employees involved in financial impropriety. This Code of
Conduct addresses items such as financial propriety, the way to treat people, relationships
with third parties, and commitment to diversity, and it has been pushed down to very low
levels by the CEO. As a result, Company F has been more focused on compliance issues such
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (see Appendix A for a brief description of this Act),
insider trading, prevention of sexual harassment, and "doing the right thing." According to
their VP for Corporate Security, "doing the right thing is ingrained here, top to bottom, and I
like to think most people live it."
Company G also views one part of their culture as doing the right thing, but they relate
this to philanthropic efforts. When asked to define doing the right thing, their Director of
Corporate Security replied, "I don't mean do the right thing because you're worried about the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or an audit after say Enron. When I say do the
right thing, I mean the company gives away millions of dollar a year for local charities and
charities around the world." Although a public company, they were until very recently
managed by a family who instilled the importance of taking care of their employees and their
community. The company provides excellent benefits, including offering eight paid hours a
Section 9.1 for further discussion on the evolution of C-TPAT.
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month to its employees participating in community service. According to Company D's
Investigations Manager, doing the right thing is "a combination of doing what's required by
law/regulations, what produces a good/safe/secure work environment, what provides adequate
return for investors, and what provides an environment where you want to attract and retain
qualified employees."
Doing the right thing obviously encompasses a broad variety of actions, and often
more than one. In this case, the company must provide their employees with ways to identify
what constitutes doing the right thing, and tools to set priorities and make decisions according
to the company's objectives. For example, if a company's primary goal is to offer their
products at the least cost possible, while also maintaining strong supply chain security that
requires added cost, this conflict will challenge employees when performing their duties.
Regardless of where it falls in the hierarchy of good deeds, accomplishing the company's
security objectives should fundamentally be considered doing the right thing.
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7 Supply Chain Security Culture
Key Success Factors
Chapter Six identifies three basic underlying assumptions that the research suggests
support adoption of a supply chain security culture. First, that security affects employees'
safety. Second, that security affects employees' livelihoods, and finally, that security is the
right thing to do. Observations from this study suggest several key success factors that, when
implemented, should help employees of all levels form these basic underlying assumptions.
This chapter outlines these key success factors that were derived from the artifacts and
espoused values outlined in Chapters Four and Five. These key success factors were selected
based on three primary criteria; first, practices that appeared frequently across multiple
companies; second, practices that demonstrated the most direct action-result relationship; and
third, practices that appeared unique, interesting, and progressive when compared to other
observations in the study. Table 7-1 provides a summary of these key success factors.
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- Senior business manager at each location responsible for security
- Corporate security staff as "consultant"
- Safety or quality programs used as model where appropriate
- Part- or full- time security personnel utilized. If using third party
retain management within company
* Shift to corporate reporting relationship where security will have
the most leverage
* Integrate C-TPAT guidelines into program
* Make business case for security
- Identify relationship between security and business objectives
- Undertake security-specific risk assessment in security program
- Measure potential or historical losses
- Quantify direct and indirect costs of not complying with security
- Identify and value collateral benefits
- Utilize Six Sigma (if used in other areas of the company)
" Collaborate on three levels
- Internal collaboration at the executive level
- External collaboration with industry
- External collaboration with government
* Integrate at executive and local level with BCP program
- Develop joint objectives and exercises
* Seek support from senior leadership across all business functions
* Conduct background screening according to security objectives
- personality traits for general employee, specific experience for
security-specific personnel
* Seek specific work experience (i.e. law enforcement, international)
* Educate employees on supply chain and security objectives
- Capitalize on existing safety or quality culture as relates to security
* Educate suppliers on security objectives
* Communicate security objectives to organization on a regular basis
* Include security in espoused values (motto, core values, code of
conduct, etc)
* Include security metrics in individual performance objectives
* Create incentives to meet security objectives
* Conduct audits to ensure adherence to security program
- Build upon safety, finance or quality audits when possible
- Share results, and impact, with employees
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7.1 Supply Chain Security Program
The research suggests that a decentralized security program that encompasses supply
chain security concerns is a key success factor. This program utilizes a corporate staff charged
with creating policies and procedures and disseminating them to the global organization, and
is led by an executive ideally no more than two steps removed from the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO), typically a Vice President or Director. This corporate staff might also include
regional or country security mangers where appropriate. The senior business manager at each
facility is charged with responsibility for security, and has access to the corporate security
staff as consultants to provide assistance on local issues when necessary. The senior business
manager at each facility may be assisted by either part- or full-time local, security-specific
personnel, depending on each facility's size and vulnerability. If local security responsibilities
are outsourced, the company maintains close oversight. When creating a new security
program, or reorganizing an existing program, companies may find it helpful to capitalize
upon existing safety or quality programs that share these decentralized characteristics.
Another key success factor involves placement in the corporate structure.
Observations from this study indicate that security program reporting relationship is not
standard across companies or industries (Section 5.2.1), but that companies aim to place
security in the corporate department that will give it the most leverage within the
organization. For example, the Operations department might be the most effective placement
for an operations-driven company, the Finance department might the best fit for an
analytically focused company, and the Compliance department might be the best fit for a
company with a strong environmental, health, and safety focus.
Another key success factor is participation in the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT). Every company we interviewed, except one, has integrated C-TPAT
guidelines into its core. Although C-TPAT has been criticized in many ways since its
inception for its long application approval delays, vague standards (Gooley, 2002), and
voluntary nature (Keane, 2004), the program appears to be effective in many ways. In
particular, C-TPAT forces companies to document security procedures already in place,
provides guidance to create or improve existing security procedures, provides a mechanism to
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require security terms in supplier contracts, and results in increased awareness of supply chain
security through all levels of the organization.
7.2 Supply Chain Security Program Implementation
This study revealed many key success factors that security programs, as described in
Section 7.1, may implement to increase overall supply chain security and resilience. These
key success factors cover a wide variety of activities, and may be implemented at different
levels of the security program structure.
Financial analysis of security measures appears to be very effective in garnering
support for security throughout the organization. Many security programs conduct financial
analysis to make the business case for security and align security objectives with overall
business objectives. This analysis is especially challenging, however, due to the difficulty of
measuring the value of preventing security breaches. This effort requires working within your
organization and with industry partners to identify common methods to quantify return on
investment (ROI) for security expenditures. Some common methods observed in this study
include conducting risk assessment within the security program, instead of relying on
centralized risk management groups, and quantifying historical losses, potential losses, and
the cost of delays before and after mitigation efforts. Financial analysis should attempt to
measure direct costs, such as actual losses due to a security incident, as well as indirect losses,
such as loss of customers due to persistent delivery delays. Holley (2005) defines these
indirect costs, which he calls "no-see-ums," as losses that cannot be paid by typical cargo
insurance policies.
Another way to make the business case for security is to identify and value collateral
benefits that have arisen from improved security. Rice and Spayd (2005) categorizes these
collateral benefits as resulting from security in a variety of areas including asset visibility and
tracking, personnel management, physical security, and development of standards. Finally,
some companies have utilized Six SigmaTM methods, which are used widely in organizations
with strong quality cultures, to conduct root cause analysis of security incidents. This type of
analysis may help to quantify potential or actual losses. Regardless of the methods used,
making the business case for security appears to be vitally important in creating a supply
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chain security culture, but extremely difficult to do. Section 9.1 addresses the need for further
research in this area.
In addition to financial analysis, the research suggests that collaboration plays an
important role in creating a supply chain security culture. This collaboration occurs at three
levels: internal collaboration with other executive leadership, external collaboration with
industry partners, and external collaboration with the government. Internal collaboration,
often in the form of cross-functional committees, helps increase security awareness
throughout all areas of the company. This appears to be particularly effective when security
becomes involved in sourcing decisions and business continuity planning efforts, as discussed
further below.
Formal collaboration with industry partners allows for sharing of threat information
and best practices for response and mitigation. These forums also provide an opportunity for
standardization of technical definitions that may help companies define the business case for
security, as described above. In areas where these collaborative efforts appear to be most
fruitful, companies do not view the fundamentals of their security programs as a competitive
advantage. Companies must balance benefits to the industry as a whole with the individual
benefits of keeping security best practices confidential. Finally, collaboration with
government facilitates information sharing, and creates relationships that may be helpful in
the event of a crisis. This collaboration is also particularly effective when companies engage
in public-private partnerships such as C-TPAT or are bound by regulations, such as the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2001 (MTSA).
One important area of internal collaboration is with the companies' security and
business continuity planning (BCP) programs. This collaboration helps to facilitate creation of
secure and resilient supply chains because security and BCP programs utilize each others'
expertise and perspective to truly understand the threats facing the company, and the best
strategies to mitigate these threats. Integration between these two programs should take place
at both the corporate level, where policies and planning take place, and the local level, where
these policies and plans are exercised. Many interviewees indicated that their comprehensive
BCP planning efforts were relatively new, and in need of improvement. This presents the
perfect opportunity for security programs to become more involved in BCP at both the
corporate and local level.
80
Finally, this research suggests that the support of executive leadership across all
departments of the company and, if possible, the CEO, is a key success factor. This support
helps demonstrate to employees the company's clear commitment to supply chain security,
and may assist security leadership to make difficult decisions based on security, such as
discontinuing service with an incompliant external partner or avoiding operations in a specific
geographic area.
7.3 Personal and Professional Performance
Chapter Six suggests three basic underlying assumptions that support creation of a
supply chain security culture: that security affects employees' safety and livelihoods, and that
security is the "right thing to do." This process of inculcating supply chain security cultural
values often begins before an employee is even hired. One key success factor is working with
a company's Human Resources (HR) Department to screen potential employees for
experience and personality traits that align with the company's security objectives. Some
companies also extend this background screening effort to their suppliers' employees. C-
TPAT guidelines on background screening provide a helpful tool to help to communicate
security screening objectives to the HR department, and the HR department of suppliers.
These desired experience and personality traits may differ for the general employee and
security-specific personnel. The research suggests that some general employee traits that
might contribute to supply chain security objectives include loyalty, ability to see the big
picture, effective communicator, self-awareness, and the ability to work in teams. When
looking to hire security-specific personnel, it may be helpful to draw from law enforcement
communities of countries in which a company operates, or seek out personnel who understand
the international nature of security.
Security education appears to be another key success factor. Some methods of
education include training new and existing personnel on the company's security objectives
and inculcating these values through socialization. This education should begin upon
orientation to the company, and continue on a regular basis through workshops or other
training seminars. The Internet appears to be an effective tool to provide continuously updated
training to employees that can be conducted at their convenience. In the absence of, and in
addition to available resources, socialization techniques such as informal security briefings or
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word of mouth communication may also help to convey the importance of security to your
employees. When applicable, companies may capitalize on existing safety or quality cultures
to emphasize the need for security. In the case of safety, an effective bridge between the two
programs might be the focus on creating a safe workplace. In companies with a strong quality
culture, an effective bridge might be a focus on protecting product quality.
An extension of this key success factor is security education of suppliers' employees
regarding security objectives, regardless of whether these objectives are included in supplier
contracts. When training foreign suppliers, companies should avoid referring to C-TPAT, but
instead focus on the guidelines as being company-specific. This helps to remove any feelings
of intimidation or confusion surrounding U.S. regulations. In addition, inviting local
influential figures to attend security-focused training sessions may help improve supplier buy-
in.
Regular communication of security objectives to employees and suppliers is another
key success factor. Effective communication demonstrates to employees that security is a high
priority of the company, and removes opportunities for them to claim that they were not
aware of their security responsibilities. Some common communication tools include posters,
hotlines, intelligence bulletins, and the Internet. A company's home page provides an easily
accessible forum to post security information of immediate concern to a global audience.
Another way to demonstrate commitment to security objectives is to include security in
the company's mission statement, motto, business conduct guidelines, or core values.
Although these items are the company's stated, or espoused, values, and not necessarily the
values that employees actually act on, interviewees in this study referred to them often. This
demonstrates that employees are aware of these espoused values, and most likely use them
during the decision making process.
Once employees are trained and constantly reminded of security objectives, including
security metrics in individual employee performance evaluations provides additional incentive
for employees to adhere to the security program. Employees generally prioritize their
performance of duties as they align with performance objectives, so this is an area that could
be used to improve employees' understanding and willingness to embrace security principles.
This not only holds employees responsible for meeting security objectives, but also increases
82
the company's "eyes and ears" to detect security incidents. In addition, monetary or merit-
based incentives may help spark individual involvement in the company security program.
Finally, implementing an audit program to ensure that security objectives are being met
at company facilities and suppliers' facilities helps to reinforce the importance of security
objectives. Companies may take advantage of existing safety, quality, or administrative
auditing teams when possible, by training them in basic security principles and adding
security items to their responsibilities. Many interviewees indicated that this assisted them to
meet security objectives at a low cost. These audits should, however, be supplemented with
security-specific audits on a less frequent basis, or as issues arise, to ensure that subtle
security issues are detected. Keeping employees apprised of audit procedures and results also
reinforces the impact of security on their well-being and that of the company.
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8 Supply Chain Security Context
Implementation of the key success factors outlined in Chapter Seven should assist
companies in creating a supply chain security culture. Before embarking on this process,
however, companies should understand the context within which they operate. This context is
especially useful when addressing differences across a company's operating or service areas,
and how to apply the key success factors in an appropriate fashion. For example security
concerns at a U.S. facility that does not handle imports or exports may be very different than
at a South American facility that routinely ships and receives foreign materials. The research
suggests three considerations that, when fully evaluated and accounted for, should help in the
adoption of a supply chain security culture.
First, companies should assess whether their business model necessitates a supply chain
security culture. A pharmaceutical company, for example, may perceive a strong need for
security to protect public health, while an apparel company may view security concerns as
secondary to lowering costs. Second, companies should understand the primary drivers behind
their supply chain security effort, as these will ultimately shape their security objectives. For
example, the pharmaceutical company referenced above may be primarily focused on
protecting products from tampering, while the apparel company may be solely focused on
theft prevention.
Finally, a company should understand their overall corporate culture in order to
champion effective change within the organization. A company with a tradition-focused
culture such as a railroad may treat security objectives very differently than a company with
an innovation-focused culture, such as a technology firm. A comprehensive understanding of
these three contextual factors should help companies adopt and apply the key success factors
outlined in Chapter Seven, with the goal of creating a supply chain security culture in
alignment with their security objectives.
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8.1 Need for Supply Chain Security
The observations in this study suggest that companies view security objectives
differently, depending on their need for supply chain security. This need may vary across
product lines, service lines, or operating areas. For example, an aircraft engine manufacturer
may have a higher need for security than a consumer goods retailer, since the consequences of
potential security breaches will vary in severity. A technology company handling high value
products might also have a very different risk profile than a toy company handling lower
value product.
Only one company included in this survey took action to explicitly measure their need
for security. This company hired a consultant to conduct benchmarking on security costs and
service, in order to clarify what level of security their company required. A number of
companies were evaluated using a matrix that included company characteristics such as size,
number of employees, number of government contracts, and corporate culture. This matrix
then gave each company a demand index which helped them understand what the company
needed from them as a security provider. Expectations of the companies in the study varied,
from those that value security very highly to those that do not value it much at all. The
differences in these values were often based on the opinion of upper management in a
company, or its corporate culture. This benchmarking process allowed the company to
understand their particular perspective on security, why there were cost differentials between
them and other companies, and what their company's expectations were for the security
program.
Another important distinction is the need for security in different areas of a company's
global operations, as security concerns vary depending on the local operating environment.
Companies that operate in a high risk country with a history of terrorism, such as Indonesia,
might place more emphasis on security in that country than in their U.S. based operations.
The need for security is also viewed differently in many countries from a cultural perspective.
For example, several companies we spoke to indicated that Chinese suppliers view security as
something they have to do because their U.S. customers have asked for it, as opposed to
something that do because they feel it is important. One non-U.S.-based company we spoke to
indicated that in their view, security is an "American problem." As a result, they located their
85
security headquarters in the U.S. instead of co-locating with their headquarters abroad.
Another company implemented their supply chain security program in North America two
years before extending the program to other operating areas. Companies should attempt to
fully understand the need for security across all geographic and operating areas, and
customize implementation of supply chain security culture key success factors to meet those
needs.
8.2 Primary Drivers of Supply Chain Security
Another contextual area of interest is understanding the company's primary driver for
creating a supply chain security culture. Although many companies have improved their
security and business continuity programs since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
and the advent of C-TPAT, terrorism does not appear to be the primary driver behind many
security programs. In fact, only nine of the twenty-one companies included in this survey
explicitly mentioned terrorism as a security concern. Some other common drivers include
theft, counterfeit, tampering, gray market diversion, and protection from trade delays caused
by increased security inspections at border crossings.
Theft, for example, is a concern that has historically plagued the low-margin apparel
industry, and it seemed to be the main focus of one apparel company despite their
participation in C-TPAT. Ensuring smooth trade flow also appeared to be a motivating factor
for many companies, for example those in the toy and electronics industries who have joined
C-TPAT not because they view their cargo at high risk, but in order to reduce border crossing
delays. The two food industry interviewees indicated that they have joined C-TPAT in order
to help protect their products from tampering of any kind that may result in a public health
crisis. While the key success factors outlined in Chapter Seven apply to any company,
regardless of their primary security drivers, the awareness of what these are will assist the
company in tailoring the program appropriately.
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8.3 Corporate Culture
As discussed in the literature, and evidenced throughout this study, corporate culture
is a difficult thing to describe, and cannot be fully understood by an outsider through
interaction with one person at a company. When interviewees were asked about their
corporate culture, however, people's perception of what values were important to their
company and how they related to security were revealing. In general, interviewees cited their
company's espoused values (business conduct guidelines, core values, mission statement,
etc.), and then added one or two less tangible items that they felt were important.
Some examples of these additional responses include "doing the right thing,"
"nothing is ever good enough," a drive to be the fastest company in the industry, or a
tendency to be very analytically oriented. These items might relate to security objectives in
the following ways. Doing the right thing for a transportation provider might mean protecting
customers' cargo at all costs. Doing the right thing for a pharmaceutical company might mean
protecting your products in order to preserve public health. Nothing is ever good enough
might indicate a company's push to always be proactive in the security arena, regardless of
past successes. This might also indicate a company's desire to benchmark constantly with
competitors to ensure that their supply chain security practices are considered the best in the
industry. The drive to be the fastest company in the industry might indicate a propensity for
participating in public-private partnerships like C-TPAT in order to reduce border crossing
delays. An analytically driven company might rely on in-depth analysis to make the case for
security, using such methods as security-specific risk assessment and Six SigmaTM root cause
analysis.
Gathering a full understanding of a corporate culture is a complex task, and one
that is not easily done by someone assimilated into that culture, for example an employee of
the corporation. It is useful, however, for companies to study their organization's culture and
how it is perceived by employees. Schein's framework used throughout this study, as well as
references provided in Chapters Two and Three, may prove useful for companies wishing to
further understand their corporate culture. This understanding may help security leadership
align the company's overall corporate culture with the company's security objectives, and
communicate these objectives in a common language throughout the company. Supply chain
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security initiatives based on this understanding will be more effective in motivating




The thesis was motivated by the increased focus on supply chain security and
resilience in the four years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These attacks
alerted private industry and governments to the potential for disruptions from high impact/low
probability events such as terrorism and, in the United States, resulted in the advent of public-
private partnerships such as the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
These public-private partnerships have encouraged industry to address supply chain security
both internally and externally, and to broaden the historically narrow scope of supply chain
security, focused on theft, to include disruptions such as natural disasters, sabotage, and
terrorism. The companies selected for this research have demonstrated high levels of
performance in creating secure and resilient supply chains. This thesis aims to study how
these companies manage their security and business continuity programs, and specifically the
role that organizational culture plays in creating secure and resilient supply chains.
Schein's organizational culture framework (Figure 2-1) was used to analyze
interviews with senior security executives from twenty-one companies across a wide variety
of industries. Schein's framework defines culture as having three levels: artifacts, which are
visible organizational structures and processes; espoused values which include strategies,
goals, and philosophies; and basic underlying assumptions, which include unconscious, taken
for granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings. Observations from these interviews,
which focused on supply chain security programs, business continuity programs, and
corporate culture, were categorized according to an expanded version of Schein's framework
provided in Figure 3-1. This expanded framework identifies artifacts, espoused values, and
basic underlying assumptions that are specific to supply chain security.
Key success factors for creating a supply chain security culture were then drawn from
these artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions (Table 7-1). These key
success factors were selected based on commonality across multiple companies, or on their
progressive nature when compared with other companies in the survey. These key success
factors address three areas: supply chain security programs, supply chain security program
89
implementation, and personal and professional performance. In summary, these key success
factors include implementing a decentralized security program, integrating C-TPAT
guidelines into this security program, making the business case for security, collaborating
internally with other business units and externally with industry and government, integrating
supply chain security and business continuity planning, educating and measuring internal
employees and suppliers' employees on supply chain security objectives, and including
security as an official espoused value of the company.
Before implementing these key success factors, it is recommended that companies
understand the supply chain security context. The research suggests that three areas should be
assessed: the company's need for supply chain security, the company's primary drivers
behind supply chain security, and the company's overall corporate culture. An understanding
of this context will assist the company in tailoring the key success factors to their needs. The
high performance of the companies included in this study suggest that implementation of the
proposed key success factors, in alignment with a company's supply chain security objectives
and corporate culture, should increase supply chain security and resilience performance
throughout the company.
9.1 Recommended Areas for Further Study
This research exposed many areas ripe for further study. The most intriguing and
elusive of these is how to measure the financial effects of supply chain security. Interviewees
provided anecdotal descriptions of what measures they were taking to conduct financial
analyses to justify supply chain security measures, but analytical methods varied widely
company to company. This task is challenging on many levels. Most importantly, it is
extremely difficult to measure incidents that have not yet occurred and may or may not have a
known probability. In addition, external analysis of these financial methods is hampered by
companies' disinclination to share loss information. Further research in this area would be
useful in assisting companies in making the business case for security.
Another area of interest is the overlap between safety and security programs and
cultures. This research indicates that many companies have benefited from building on
90
existing safety programs to both administer security programs and motivate employees to
embrace security objectives. Some interviewees did indicate, however, that they feel security
is most effective when treated as an entirely separate discipline. The positive and negative
repercussions of integrating these two disciplines will certainly be of interest as attention to
supply chain security increases in the future.
This research focused on interviewing senior security executives about their
company's security programs and their interaction with business continuity planning (BCP)
programs. In many cases, security and BCP programs do interact in the form of joint oversight
committees, planning, and exercises. Many interviewees indicated, however, that the move
toward comprehensive BCP is relatively new and that their programs are in need of
improvement. This presents a unique opportunity for increased integration between security
and BCP. A similar study focused on BCP executives, in order to assess their perception of
integrating with security, would no doubt prove useful in furthering this objective.
The recent announcement of new C-TPAT guidelines by U.S. Customs and Border
Patrol in March 2005 indicates that this program is ever-evolving. Further study of C-TPAT
and its impact on supply chain security, especially in the area of supplier interaction and
enforcement, would prove useful. This research indicates that C-TPAT has provided a vehicle
for companies to include security guidelines in contracts with suppliers, but few have gone
beyond these contractual obligations to ensure that their security objectives are being met
through education and auditing. Supply chain security's value is directly related to its
application across all links of the supply chain, therefore additional research focused on
integration between companies and their suppliers would be useful.
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Appendix A
This Appendix contains brief descriptions of:
* Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
* Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
* Container Security Initiative (CSI)
* Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)
* 24-hour Rule
* Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2001 (MTSA)
* International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)
* Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
* Smart and Secure Trade lanes Initiative (SST)
* Department of Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
The United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) instituted the C-TPAT program in
November 2001. This public-private partnership, launched two months after the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, was born out of CBP's recognition that close cooperation with industry
would be paramount to providing the highest level of supply chain security in the U.S. C-TPAT
aims to engage the private sector in securing the global supply chain in exchange for streamlined
inspection processes. In addition to these benefits, C-TPAT validation opens the door for
participation in other CBP initiatives such as the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program, the
Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE).
Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
The FAST program, commenced in December 2002, improves coordination between participants
in Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. to improve clearance procedures at border crossings. Some of
these procedures include risk management, supply chain security practices, information
technology, and partnering techniques. Through the FAST program, importers and carriers who
are C-TPAT certified are allowed expedited clearance at border crossings. These C-TPAT
carriers will use FAST dedicated border crossing lanes and experience reduced delays.
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Container Security Initiative (CSI)
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) places U.S. inspectors at select high-volume ports
overseas to improve clearance efficiency for cargo destined for the U.S. This program was
initiated in January 2002, with the goal of pushing America's zone of security outward. CSI
utilizes intelligence to target certain containers, prescreens targeted containers before they are
loaded on to the ship, and uses smarter, more tamper-resistant containers. As of April 2005, CSI
included twenty European ports, ten Asian ports, two Canadian ports and two African ports.
Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)
ACE is the new Customs and Border Patrol import information technology system that will
replace the current Automated Commercial System (ACS) that has been in place since 1984.
ACE aims to eventually automate much of the information processing for cargo crossing at U.S.
borders.
24-Hour Rule
The 24-hour rule came into effect on December 22, 2002. This rule requires that all carriers
provide CBP with cargo declarations 24-hours before cargo destined for the U.S. is loaded on a
vessel at a foreign port.
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted the ISPS Code as an amendment to the
Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) in December, 2002. The ISPS, which came into
effect in July 2004, requires risk assessment of vessels and port facilities, and identification of
mitigation measures to address vulnerabilities.
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2001 (MTSA)
Congress passed the MTSA in November 2001. The MTSA requires security plans and
improvements for certain vessels, facilities, and outer continental shelf entities (i.e. offshore oil
rigs), mandates the use of the Automatic Identification System for all deep draft vessels subject
to the IMO's SOLAS convention, and mandates creation of Area Maritime Security Committees
for all commercial ports. An important aspect of the MTSA is that owner/operators is responsible
for securing their own facilities, with federal oversight primarily by the U.S. Coast Guard.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
Congress passed The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in July 2002 in response to a series of high
profile company collapses due to poor corporate financial practices. The stated goal of the Act is
to "protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws."
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Smart and Secure Tradelanes Initiatives (SST)
The Strategic Council on Security Technology launched the Smart and Secure Tradelanes
Initiative (SST) in July 2002. This industry-driven program focuses on container security and
tracking, utilizing infrastructure and technology advancements. This initiative aims to
demonstrate the principles of existing government programs such as C-TPAT, CSI, and MTSA
as discussed above.
Department of Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)
The HSAS comprises five threat levels, with corresponding colors, that alert U.S. citizens to
potential threats, and indicates the level of protective measures to be taken when a specific sector
or industry is threatened. The five threat levels include: low (green), guarded (blue), elevated









Thank you for agreeing to speak with us and participate in our research project, we will try to use
your time wisely. As part of our research project studying the supply chain response to
terrorism, we are contacting senior security executives in various industries to better understand
what role organizational culture plays in a firms' supply chain security and resilience practices.
Your input will be very useful, as it will provide a data based perspective on the important issues
that companies are dealing with in responding to the new threat.
Before we begin, let me give you a brief description of what we hope to accomplish through
this interview. First, we are interested in finding out if there is such a thing as a "security
culture." Second, we hope to determine what role, if any, your firm's corporate culture or
other cultures such as safety or quality, have played in the development of this security
culture. Finally, we are interested in determining how your security program and business
continuity planning program interact.
Before we start, may we tape the conversation so we can focus on your responses rather than
writing down your responses? We will use this only to check what we heard later on and these
will not be shared outside of our research team at MIT. If you prefer, we would be happy to sign
a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) to assure you that we will protect the confidentiality of the
information you provide us.
Our assessment of this questionnaire estimates that it will take approximately 30-45 minutes. We
realize, however, that some additional time might allow us to dive deeper into certain subjects of
interest and with less time we can prioritize certain questions. In order to be sure we honor your
commitments, could you let us know how much time you have available for this interview?
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1) Could you give us your title and a brief overview of your role in the organization?
2) Could you provide us with a brief description of how your firm manages its security
program?
3) What was the impetus behind creation of your security program, and what tools did you
use to structure it?
a. Safety program?
b. Regulatory requirements?
c. Public private partnership?
d. Existing security program?
4) Where does your group fit in to the overall firm organization?
a. In relation to risk management, security and business continuity planning?




6) How is your security program integrated with operations and logistics?
7) Are your security personnel primarily responsible for security, or do they have other





8) Do you feel that certain employee backgrounds are particularly conducive to embracing
security principles? If so, why?
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9) How are employees held accountable for adhering to the security program?
a. Performance evaluations?
b. Employee level or leadership level accountability?
c. Example?






11) How are details of the security program communicated to the broader organization?
a. Reporting practices?
b. Internal communication practices?
c. Communication with external partners?
d. Security to corporate?
e. Example?
12) In what other ways do you instill the importance of security into your organization?
13) Do you feel that your security program has affected your organization's behavior or
core beliefs, sometimes referred to as culture?
14) Can you provide an example of how your firm's security program or culture has
contributed to avoiding a disruption?
a. Example, training secretaries to keep a look out for unusual people
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15) How does your security culture fit, or not fit, with your organization's overall corporate
culture?
a. Examples?
16) Can you describe any other programs that have affected your organization's
behavior or core beliefs, such as safety or quality?




17) How are these programs related to your security program? Are they coordinated in any
way?
18) How has the other program (Safety, Quality) affected your security program?
19) On a scale of 1-5 with 1 being fully satisfied and 5 fully dissatisfied, how satisfied are
you and your company with the performance of the security program?
20) Does your firm have a business continuity program?
a. Business Continuity Plan?
b. Test/Revisit/Update the plan?
c. Does the BCP address external partners?
21) How does your firm coordinate its security program with its business continuity
planning program?
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22) Who leads the business continuity program in your firm, and may we speak with them?
23) Is there anything else that we haven't covered that you feel would be relevant to the
purposes of this interview?
24) In your opinion, what companies have a strong security culture?
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Appendix C
Matrix outlining interview observations for each company.
Notes:
1) Company names are disguised. See Table 3-1 for general characteristics of each company.
2) Boxes marked with an "x" indicate that that specific practice was discussed during the
interview. If a box is not marked with an "x," this does not mean that a company does not
conduct that specific practice, but rather that the practice did not come up in the interview. This
implies that the practice ism most likely not a core part of the company's security or business
continuity program.
3) Some observations have been inferred by the author.
4) The two consulting companies that were also interviewed are not included in this matrix, since
their experiences reflect on practices conducted by their clients, not by their own company.
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